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Abstract 
This thesis will address the issue of legitimacy within international security, with a 
focus on the use of force by states. Using military force against other actors in the 
international system will initiate a debate on its perceived legitimacy by several 
different audiences. This investigation uses the Regional Security Complex Theory  of 
Buzan and Wæver and the assumptions of Idealism to instigate the analytical 
framework on legitimacy. This thesis will analyse the role and importance of 
legitimacy and its potential influence it, as a concept, can have on the political agenda 
of states and organisations. It will also identify the multitude of factors which affect 
the perception of legitimacy. Moreover, it will analyse how multilateralism can 
address the different audiences’ demand for legitimacy as a doctrine in the modern 
world. The investigation will also show how the shortcomings of the international 
system limit the successful regulation of state actions in regards to the use of force. 
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Introduction 
Force and power have always been intricately connected to the question of 
legitimacy. Both pragmatically and philosophically have the use of force been 
analysed by individuals and groups towards ‘the right’ to use force. Michael Walzer 
writes in the introduction to “Just and Unjust Wars” that “For as long as men and 
women have talked about war, they have talked about it in terms of right and 
wrong”1. I hold this statement to be true because no other human activity is as 
scrutinised as the use of force against other individuals, groups or states. 
Unfortunately, human history is the history of conflict and power struggles. Though 
this assumption is strictly generalising and specific, one must acknowledge the 
influence of wars and conflict on the development of human society and the 
distribution of power in contemporary politics and international relations. It is 
important to note at this early stage that the rules and norms of the international 
community plays an enormous part in influencing and determining state behaviour to 
a much larger extent than before. Historically, the external influences on a state, 
nation or empire was limited to the perceived threat or potential benefit of relations. 
In the modern age, state sovereignty is eroded to incorporate state obligations and 
limitations. For example, the use of war to promote state interest is deemed 
unacceptable by the global community and can cause severe consequences for a 
state breaking these norms. This is the framework for this thesis.  
Legitimacy has become an important part of the modern analysis of international 
relations, increasingly after the end of the Cold War.  
At the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed the start of an enormous shift in 
ideas, ideology and system structures. The nature of international relations in the 
period between 1945 and 1991 was identified by superpower rivalry and this created 
the umbrella system for everything in international politics. After the end of this 
period, there was a distinct need to identify the characteristics of the new system. 
Scholars and policymakers needed to navigate the waters of international affairs 
                                              
1
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within a new framework. Numerous ideas and theories have been introduced since 
then to account for this paradigm shift.  
I will take the initial stance of the regional security complexes of Buzan and Wæver 2 
to analyse the issue of legitimacy. I consider this theory to be accurate in describing 
the current status of international relations and will give me the framework for 
conducting my analysis. By introducing the concept of regional security structures, I 
will attempt to identify the behaviour of states in relation to force. In addition I will 
add the assumptions of Idealism and Just War Theory which focus upon the moral 
and ethical aspects of the use of force. The debate of idealism in politics and force is 
central to this investigation because it takes on the argument that morality is present 
in modern state decision-making.  
 
Hypothesis 
I hope to show the reader the different factors which affect perceived legitimacy and 
how states and organisations interact with different actors on this issue. I argue, 
quite extensively, that legitimacy has become a part of the new global security 
structure, due to the abovementioned change in the global security structure, but 
also because of increased information available to the public and participation of civil 
society in political affairs. I also hope to show the shortcomings of international law in 
providing sufficient basis for legitimacy of force. Furthermore, I argue that the 
perception of legitimacy when using force is dependent upon a moral justification 
which is founded in the cultural ethics of the relevant regions and nations.  
The findings of the abovementioned analysis will be used to assess the legitimating 
impact of multilateralism in the modern world. I hope to illustrate that legitimacy has 
become an integral part of using force and that a multilateral approach, through 
regional integration and global acceptance, is the best alternative at present.  
                                              
2
 Buzan, Barry & Wæver, Ole (2003) Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
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Structure of the Thesis 
I have decided to shape this thesis to make it as analytical as possible. As stated 
above, it is my objective to investigate the interaction between legitimacy and force 
within the framework of the international security arena. I will then have to 
investigate the different concepts on their own, as well as their common properties.  
Chapter one offers the descriptive elements necessary to introduce the different 
concepts used in the further investigation. It will analyze the nature of legitimacy 
from a philosophical and sociological perspective as well as attempt to investigate the 
nature of force both historically and its contemporary uses.  This is necessary for the 
overall structure of the thesis because any analysis in international relations will 
include concepts which are intricately complex and will have differing definitions to 
different disciplines. I will need to present my understanding of the issues before I 
can analyze their significance to modern security policy.  
 
Section two will start the theoretical analysis of the system in which the thesis will be 
written. As stated above, I have decided to use the principles of the Regional Security 
Complex Theory of Buzan and Wæver to create the framework in which I will apply 
my arguments on legitimacy and the use of force. I believe this theory offers an 
accurate description of the current global structure of security and is a therefore 
suitable arena to conduct my investigation in. The general assumption is that “the 
post-Cold War security order will exhibit substantially higher levels of regional 
security autonomy than was the case during the Cold War”.3 This will affect the 
security awareness of states and encourage the strengthening of regional security 
ties in order to ensure the protection of sovereign integrity and security.  
Because the issue of legitimacy is closely linked to morality and ethics by nature, I will 
also add elements of Idealism and Just War Theory to the investigation, because they 
                                              
3
 Buzan, Barry & Wæver, Ole (2003) Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pg 76 
9 
 
will supplement the RSCT principles with a debate on whether the decision to use 
force by states today is influenced by morality or national interests.  
 
Chapter three will be the presentation of arguments and findings. This will be the 
main section of the thesis as I will use the background and theory presented in the 
two previous sections and apply them to the concepts of force and legitimacy.  I will 
sub-divide this section into four main categories. First, I will present my arguments 
for the increased significance of legitimacy when analyzing force in the modern era. 
Second, I will present the different audiences to which legitimacy force must be 
legitimsed and the consequences of illegitimacy. Next I will analyse what factors of 
international security and force affect the perception of legitimacy. The fourth 
section will try to use the factors and audiences identified previously to analyse the 
potential legitimacy of multilateralism. The last part of my analysis will be a debate 
on the role of legitimacy in the future and necessary steps towards ensuring its 
further significance.  
Limitations 
Naturally the field of international relations is too large to analyse in this thesis, even 
though it might seem necessary when assessing the twin concepts of legitimacy and 
force. In order to keep the thesis relevant to the task at hand, I will have to limit the 
scope of the analysis to some extent. For example, one must take some assumptions 
for granted with little criticism and apply them to the arguments and conclusions of 
the thesis. For example, I take the basic assumptions of the RSCT4 to represent the 
basic structure of international security without initiating a debate on this issue. I will 
outline these assumptions when proposing the theory of Buzan and Wæver below.  
Furthermore, I will only give significant attention to states and institutions as actors 
in this analysis. Agreeably, a wider debate on force, which includes para-military 
                                              
4
 Regional Security Complex Theory – in - Buzan, Barry & Wæver, Ole (2003) Regions and Powers – The 
Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
10 
 
groups and other non-governmental actors, is necessary for the wider analysis of 
legitimacy. However, I will assess these actors as indirect actors, because this thesis is 
primarily concerned with the behaviour and decisions of states. The theory of 
Regional Security Complexes offer a framework for incorporating non-state actors, 
however I will limit my attention to the inter-governmental organisations which are 
relevant to a modern security analysis.  
Methodological Discourse 
Equally important to the structure and validity of an analytical thesis and the theory 
used, is the method the writer opts to use to write the investigation. This thesis will 
be conducted within a qualitative framework, with most of its sources being based on 
written accounts as well as opinions acquired through speeches and interviews. This 
is the natural development of the methodological approach because this thesis is 
concerned with analysis of a concept which cannot be numerically or quantitatively 
recorded to a sufficient extent. Nothing is more important to a sound piece of 
academic writing than structure and method. This is due to the need to present what 
is written to an external reader and the presentation of the work is vital for the 
impression and overall quality of the thesis.  
Defining Method 
Method is the heart and soul of any work; it is the presentation and the order of its 
content. This thesis will use a mainly qualitative and interpretational approach. I have 
decided to use written accounts, i.e. books and documents as well as statements and 
opinions of others to support or even counter-argue my own points. It is important 
that the thesis appears as objective as possible, one might even say as legitimate in 
its claims as possible, to keep to the spirit of my field of study. At heart, methodology 
is the source of acquiring knowledge through a set of scientific mechanisms which are 
transparent and orderly. International relations and politics is hard to research in 
terms of numbers and statistics, although some parts of this field is studied by 
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opinion polls and analyzing probability factors, it will never be the dominant research 
method to acquire new knowledge or challenge pre-existing dogmas.  
Use of Method in this Thesis 
I will attempt to use the opinions and statements of others as objectively as possible, 
and as I argued above, this is as close to true non-subjectivity as can be expected of a 
thesis written within international relations on a qualitative basis. The thesis itself is 
divided into three sections; this is to have a more concise structure which will support 
the development of my arguments.  
It is vital for a thesis of such depth to have a thorough analysis of the underlying ideas 
and assumptions which give rise to the essay question. I had to ask myself what the 
key issues surrounding legitimate use of force were. I believe I have identified the 
main areas of attention below, which includes issues of an historical, political and 
philosophical nature.  
It will be in this section that most obvious scrutiny from readers will come forward, 
because it is in the descriptive part of the thesis that I present my underlying 
assumptions and reveal what issues and areas of focus I assign the greatest 
importance. For example, I have given a historical account of the role of force in 
international relations. The sources I use to illustrate my points in this section will be 
subjective by nature, as the author writes his work from his viewpoint. Historical 
accounts will always be through the eyes of the historian. Nevertheless, it is 
important to add this section to this thesis as it will give my work an element of 
historical grounding, at the same time I must attempt to maximize the objectivity of 
this section so as to legitimize the claims I make.  
When the conclusion is presented and the hypothesis is debated, the method and 
presentation will have played an important part in the delivery of the thesis itself.  
The method determines the structure of any academic work and by incorporating a 
strong methodology the overall impression is improved and the arguments of the 
author are brought forward as effectively as possible. I believe that the structure of 
12 
 
this thesis is clear and effective which will serve its purpose well. The hypothesis that 
is stated in the introduction and first section will be supported by the following 
sections by analysing the in-depth issues as well as determining their real world 
impact. The following chapters will examine the background issues and define the 
concepts that this analysis works with.  
Legitimacy 
One might argue that complete legitimacy is the ’holy grail’ of modern security policy. 
Most would agree, however, that it is almost impossible to achieve full legitimacy.5 I 
will also take a closer look at legitimacy as a political tool and how it affects the 
collective conscience. The term legitimacy is synonymous with lawfulness, legality 
and rightfulness6 and can be defines as “lawfulness by virtue of being authorized or in 
accordance with law”7. This definition shows how intricately the issue of legitimacy is 
related to political processes and anchoring in legality. In essence a state’s decisions 
and policies must be a reflection of the public opinion, culture and self interest. 
Moreover, it must have a basis of approval by the institutions and people that give 
the state its power. A modern democracy in a multi-party system is dependent on 
approval to remain in power, therefore its quest for legitimacy, which is the reflection 
of approval, must be strenuous and never-ending. On the other hand, military action 
and conflict politics is specially affected by the legitimacy debate. Broken down, 
legitimacy is merely a perception of right and wrong and public perception of doing 
the correct thing. This leads to the debate on whether true legitimacy or the illusion 
of legitimacy is the real objective in modern international politics. One must 
acknowledge at an early stage that regardless of how legitimate a specific event 
appears, there will always be a party or an actor which will view it as illegitimate.8  
War is invariably accompanied by debate, if not controversy, over the legitimacy to 
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6
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use force9, therefore legitimacy in itself must be defined an analysed. I argue that the 
legitimacy debate has always been present in international relations, but it is in the 
contemporary world that its importance has made it a pivotal issue.  
 
Legitimacy as a concept in politics is a fluid phenomenon. Political decisions must be 
legally and morally grounded in pre-existing laws and the constitution, as well as the 
general approval of the public and its cultural and ethical norms.10 When broken 
down, legitimacy is merely a concept of explaining what the public and other critics 
will accept based on principles of justice and accountability. Basically this means that 
an event or action, whether in military affairs, politics or in the public sphere, will be 
viewed as legitimate when it has either been ‘given permission’ by an authority 
and/or is grounded in social and/or cultural norms and standards. One can then 
argue further that cultural and social norms and standards become the authority 
which grants permission and legitimacy and therefore limits the argument to a figure 
or concept of perceived authority.  Legitimacy is intricately connected to political 
accountability and as I will argue further in this thesis, political influence is at stake 
when a state decides to use force. It should be every government’s desire to 
maximize the perceived legitimacy of its policies. Every political decision, including 
health care, tax and education undergoes some level of scrutiny among the public 
and other domestic actors, it is the perceived legitimacy of all the government’s 
decisions that constitutes its popular support. In security issues and foreign affairs, 
the amount of actors that scrutinize a state’s actions will increase from the domestic 
scene and legitimacy is therefore harder to achieve. This is at least a general rule I will 
try to follow in this thesis. I find this interesting because in international relations, 
there is a direct correlation between the increase in actors who judge state legitimacy 
and the levels of political accountability and potential consequences of perceived 
illegitimacy. This is in comparison to the national domestic scene of course.  David 
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 Armstrong, Farrell & Maiguashca (2005), Force and Legitimacy in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge 
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Armstrong argues that “if the meanings of legitimacy, and its relation to law and 
force, are complex and controversial questions in domestic societies, they are far 
more so in the international context.” 11 Furthermore, one can argue that this 
phenomenon can be explained by the lack of clear authority and guidelines for 
achieving legitimacy in the international stage. 
I will come back to the issues of legitimacy in different levels of politics and society 
further on in this thesis.   
 
Historical and philosophical background 
The world has witnessed a countless number of different regimes and political system 
through the ages, from the tribal organisations of the ancient past to the highly 
complex and inter-related systems of the modern world. However, they have all been 
influenced by a power hierarchy of decision making and therefore, directly or 
indirectly, affected by the need to legitimize one’s actions as leader or government. 
The main principle that guides this trend is that all political decisions that affect other 
people must be viewed as just and acceptable, dependant, of course, on the nature 
of the given regime. People have always needed to find logic in the decisions of their 
leaders. In ancient Egypt the Pharoes ruled by principle of divine selection and 
supernatural powers.12 This proved to be an immensely powerful method of ’crowd 
control’, as it was a principle that was easy to accept and in accordance with the 
cultural and religions norms of the time. This aspect of legitimacy is far removed from 
how legitimacy is achieved today, save a few examples of politicized religion, most 
notably in the Middle East.  
 
One can also look at the realist principles for an explanation of legitimacy in 
international relations. A central tenet of traditional realism is that survival is the 
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main objective of any state.13 To ensure survival a state must seek power in the 
international system; an example of a ’survival of the fittest’ system. The use of force 
against other states is then at the centre of the international system and it is 
characterised by anarchy. Historically, this is a relevant scenario and power is then 
legitimiced by a need to survive. Thucydides writes in ’the Peloponnesian War’ that 
”Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the 
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”14 Use of force as a 
method of gaining advantage and power is then legitimiced by the necessities of the 
system. It is easy to convince an uninformed public of the potential danger of a ’kill or 
be killed’ system of state relations.  
In the modern world, and especially in Europe and North America, the age of mass 
communication and free flow of information, makes it harder to convince a 
population of the dangers from other states unless that danger is real. Therefore, the 
realist assumptions of the anarchy in the international system and how it necessitates 
the use of force, is inapplicable to many states today. When the public is involved and 
informed in the forming of policies and their consequences, a different and more 
complex method for achieving legitimacy is needed.  I will return to this debate on 
the role of the people and civil society later in the thesis.  
 
Legitimacy VS Legality 
One of the main challenges when assessing legitimate use of force is to analyse the 
necessity for legality in a claim to legitimacy. I will further analyze this problem when 
I present my arguments, however it is necessary to highlight the issue as a significant 
part of the concept of legitimacy. As stated above, legitimacy can be seen as an 
extension of being given permission by an authority, whether this authority is 
abstract or concrete. In the modern world, the legal system in a state regulates what 
is considered an illegal act and what is allowed within a specific framework. The 
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international system of state interaction needs a strong actor, universally 
acknowledged, to fill this role. One can argue that such an actor is present in the 
United Nations, however few people would argue that it is very effective in regulating 
legal and illegal activities.15 The main challenge to such an actor is the issue of 
authority and punitive capabilities. There are few effective means of punishment for 
illegal activities among states, mainly because there is no set framework of laws 
which concretely guide states in their actions. The International Court of Justice and 
the International Criminal Court are two hopeful initiatives for such a system, 
however history have only proven their inefficiency and incapability to effectively ruel 
in inter-state disputes.16  
The United Nations Charter is one document which attempts to set commonly 
accepted rules on the use of force. According to the United Nations Charter’s Article 
51 permits the “right of the individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”17  However, 
without a legal system capable of independent punishment, the international system 
will always remain partly anarchic. This debate will be integral to the issue of 
legitimacy in the modern world and I will return to it when analyzing the future of 
legitimacy in international politics.  
 Why do states need legitimacy? 
States need legitimacy to defend their actions and policies to a multitude of 
spectators and critics. All actions and decisions undertaken by the state should have a 
moral and legal grounding in the state’s legal system and commonly accepted values; 
this will ensure a perception of legitimacy.18  
The modern age has witnessed an increasing participation of the public in state 
affairs and politics. This is, of course not universally true, as some states and regions 
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enjoy more civil freedom than other. Nonetheless, it is important to note the 
correlation between the public demanding more political accountability and the state 
attempting more strenuously to legitimate its policies. States will need to legitimize 
their actions and policies to several audiences, and the consequences of illegitimacy 
will vary depending on the audience.  
 
Legitimacy is linked with the impression of individuals and groupings to the extent 
that they accept it as right or just when they are convinced of its “necessity, utility or 
moral value.”19 The path to achieving this perception is complex and is dependent 
upon the relationship between state and population. I argue in this thesis that 
legitimacy has become a result of perception from different audiences, which in turn 
invites a wider analysis of international politics. Force itself is legitimized when it is 
viewed as necessary and within moral and legal boundaries. I want to conduct this 
analysis with a regionalist approach on multilateralism due to the general impression 
that collective action has a greater altruistic base than unilateralism. I will return to 
this assumption further in this thesis.  
 
The Use of Force 
Force is one of the main themes in this thesis and should carefully be analysed. It is 
one of the most complex issues in politics and international relations as it is directly 
related to the very function of the state and the international community and it 
challenges a state’s basic survival instinct.  It is important to take a closer look at what 
constitutes force in international relations and define how use of force is relevant to 
this thesis.  
Types of force - Diplomatic and Military 
A state holds control over a wide spectrum of tools it can use to influence other 
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actors in the international community. It will utilise these tools, or methods, 
depending on the severity of the situation, the desired effect and the relationship to 
the other state or non-state actor.20 In effect, force is the tool to make other states 
comply with your will or as Thucydides writes in the Melian dialogue; “the strong do 
what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”21 Although this is a simplistic 
view of inter-state behaviour, it given a good indication on the nature and intention 
of the use of force in international relations. In sum, use of force will always be to 
achieve an underlying goal.  
When studying the use of force, one is mostly focused on the physical manifestation 
of military might. Nevertheless, force can be applied in other ways, such as through 
diplomatic pressure or economic sanctions.22 It is important to analyse these tools as 
well as military means as examples of potential force that can be used by a state. In 
much the same way, however not as susceptible to criticism, alternative ways of 
force will be subjected to criticisms to its legitimacy.  This thesis will mainly look at 
military activity as examples of force; however it is important to note that diplomatic 
and military force is often interlinked in the same campaign. The diplomatic attempts 
before or during a security operation may be the basis for the legitimacy claims, it 
may imply that military force was the only alternative solution. 
If one defines force as the functions of attempting to compel another actor to do as 
you wish or dissuade an actor to refrain from doing something, then diplomacy must 
be the most widely used type of force in the modern world. In addition it is a more 
cost effective method of persuasion.  
Use of force in History and International Relations 
Historically one can observe that the international structure of relations was more in 
accordance with Thucydides claim that might equals right.23 This can be explained by 
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the lack of international regulatory bodies and organs to monitor the behavior of 
states and no specific norms on accepted use of force among states. Through history 
we have witnessed countless wars and disputes between actors in the international 
system, all of which has been the result of direct use or threat of use of force against 
another actor. Modern conflict though, is different to the historical examples. The 
nature of conflict has changed and so has the rules of the international game. The 
essence of this thesis supports this claim, because historically, legitimizing the use of 
force was less imminent and necessary. One can identify a significant shift in the 
nature of conflict and military affairs in the twentieth century. This can be explained 
by the events of two world wars, the impact of mass communication and globalism, 
as well as the Cold War, which introduced the world to super power warfare which is 
low in intensity and large scale political disputes. The role of force has changed to a 
more indirect impact through the potential destruction and effect an attack could 
possibly have. Diplomacy and power politics have taken over as the leading tool in 
international security.  
  
Security policy is especially subjected to public criticism due to the unpopular 
dichotomy of high expenditure and potential casualties. Committing national defense 
resources to a conflict, whether through multilateral engagement and obligations or 
not, is always going to affect public opinion and political opposition. Security policy 
comes with a high political risk, mostly due to its volatility in affecting voters and 
media polls. Further on in this thesis I will take a closer look at the actors in society 
and the global community which demand legitimate claims to the use of force.  
Defining the concept of Multilateralism 
At the core of the challenge this thesis faces, lays the issue of how the use of force is 
conducted today and under what framework it is presented to the world. In 
traditional international relations theory, which in turn will be discussed further 
below, one can identify a common denominator in the importance attributed to 
20 
 
power. Power in this sense is defined as;”an actor's ability to exercise influence over 
other actors within the international system”.24 Naturally the division of power will 
create one or a few powerful states and several less powerful actors in the system. 
Given that any state’s primary aim is survival and power-maximisation then an 
anarchical system will be competitive and dangerous for the less powerful actors.25 It 
is within this framework that alliances have emerged in international relations, on the 
basis of rationality and common interest.   
The concept of finding allies, working together for a common goal of survival or 
cooperating to enhance one’s position somehow, is far from a modern phenomenon. 
Agreed, it is more commonplace and accepted to incorporate diplomacy in a 
countries political strategy in the modern age, in fact it is almost unthinkable not to, 
however, the same concepts of multilateralism and alliances we apply today, can be 
identified through history as well. In ‘The Peloponnesian Wars’, Thucydides explains 
the politics of ancient Greece and the use of complex power politics, not unlike the 
kind we see in contemporary international relations.26 
The basic tenet that generates this logic is the historically prevalent anarchy of the 
international system. Given that survival is the primary aim of any state, alliances are 
a logical solution to a smaller state’s security dilemma.  
According to Robert Keohane, the definition of multilateralism is “the practice of 
coordinated national policies in groups of three or more states.”27  If one takes this 
definition and adds the security dimension, which Keohane undoubtedly 
incorporated, it will offer a good view of what multilateralism means to states in the 
modern political system. In effect it shows that multilateralism is the umbrella 
concept for the cooperation of several states to collectively work towards enhancing 
and securing their interests or those of a larger system or community.  
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Now I will take a closer look at multilateralism in practice today. To do so I will 
examine three distinct aspects of this concept which I have identified 
Firstly, there is the issue of multilateral action vs. unilateral action. This is not 
dependant on being a military argument, but can be related to any cultural, social or 
economic aspect of the modern world. It is important to notice at this point, that the 
increasingly globalised world view inter-connectedness as a positive trait and does 
not, to any great extent at least, encourage unilateral behaviour. It has become the 
norm to assume that progress and efficiency is more likely when cooperation with 
other states is present. This might be more relevant to trade and the economical 
sphere, but it overlaps into the social and political spheres as well.  
In security and military affairs, which this thesis is mostly concerned, multilateral 
action has become the expected path, especially under the United Nation Charter.  
This issue links directly back to the main theme of this thesis, that of legitimacy and 
the desire by states to achieve perceived legitimacy in its action. I would argue 
therefore that unilateral action, especially of a military nature, is an option or 
prerogative of the mighty few, rather than a logical discourse of the many. This can 
be explained by the negative consequences most likely to follow a unilateral military 
action by the global community, consequences which only strong and leading state 
might endure and accept.28 To illustrate one can look to the bitter feud of the United 
Nations Security Council in 2003 over the use of force against Iraq. The international 
critique was widespread, but the US government, being the only remaining 
superpower in the international system, decided that it could withstand the 
consequences and that the benefits of the use of force was sufficient.29 This 
alternative is not available to most states due to the rigidity of the international 
system and the positions of the greater powers. Therefore multilateral approaches in 
international relations will be the most viable option to most states because of the 
rational logic of benefits which will accompany such behaviour. Unilateral behaviour 
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can lead to exclusion from the international community on issues of economic and 
political relevance; moreover it can invoke sanctions and less favourable trade 
agreements.30  
Secondly, one can see how multilateralism offers a sense of identity in a larger group 
or civilisation.  
 It is important for a small state to maximise security potential and, arguably, the best 
option is integration into an alliance of some sort. Furthermore, the benefits of 
adherence to a larger community can be seen in increased or free trade, technology 
and burden-sharing. Robert Keohane writes that “multilateralism in practice appear 
to generate among their members, expectations of diffuse reciprocity.” 31This means 
that the benefits of membership in a community or institution will not constantly 
generate benefits, but assistance or reciprocal help can be expected over time. This 
will generate a notion of long-term benefits and will also produce a sense of inclusion 
and security.  
This can be illustrated by the European Union’s role and the desire of several 
European countries to join the exclusive organisation. Membership in the EU will 
include economic cooperation, participation in the large-scale development plans of 
the union, which benefits the economically less developed countries profoundly.  
I will hesitate to bring forth Huntington’s civilisation theory and their clashes, but it is 
clear that a states desire to take part in multilateral communities and activities will 
show a sense of irredentist character of belonging and adherence; all within the 
concept of maximising position and situation.32  
Lastly, as most relevant to this thesis is the issue of security and military operations.    
 As I argued above, multilateralism has been a part of state interaction through 
                                              
30
 John Gerard Ruggie, (1993) Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institutional Form.” – in - Ruggie, J.G. 
Multilateralism Matters: the Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, pg 34 
31
 Robert O. Keohane, - in – Ruggie J.G., (1993), Multilateralism Matters, The Theory and Praxis of and 
Institutional Form, New York, Columbia University Press, pg 11 
32
 Ambrosio, Thomas, (2001),  Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, Westport, Praeger 
Publishers, pg 22 
23 
 
history, not limiting this phenomenon to states, but also villages, tribes and kings. The 
whole point of cooperation is to promote common benefits and positions. In the 
modern age, multilateral interaction and participation has become the norm for the 
modern state.33 Few states today dare pursue a unilateral stance, mainly because the 
cons are too obvious.  
We can find several security focused inter-state organisations today, most notably 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations’ Security Council. 
Especially NATO’s role is prominently military, with the most significant part of its 
Treaty being Article 5, which states that an attack or aggression against a member 
country, is to be regarded as an attack on the organisation itself, and therefore all its 
members.34 This will give the member states a sense of adherence to a strong 
security community as well as guarantee that it will be supported if its territorial 
integrity is compromised. Another aspect of organisations such as NATO is that it 
offers a firm alternative to peaceful intervention and peacekeeping. NATO has taken 
part in several military operations, most notably in Kosovo in 1999 and presently in 
Afghanistan.35 Because it is a well established security community it has been given 
situational mandates by the Security Council to conduct military operations. Because 
it is a multilateral organisations and therefore based on common objectives and not a 
unilateral agenda, its perceived legitimacy is quite significant. I will take a closer look 
at this aspect of multilateralism and the link to legitimacy further on in this essay. 
 
As noted above, multilateralism is a historically significant part of state interaction 
and can be seen as a part and extension of alliance theory based statecraft.  An 
assumption we can draw from this chapter is that multilateral action, as compared to 
unilateral behaviour, is more likely to be perceived as legitimate by its audience. I will 
return to this assumption below. Moreover, it also allows for greater and more 
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efficient interaction because it encourages closer bonds between states and enables 
trade and technology sharing. I have tried not to limit multilateralism to the security 
sphere of politics as the concept itself is quite broad. On this issue John Gerard 
Ruggie writes; “Multilateral is an adjective that modifies the noun institution. Thus, 
Multilateralism depicts a generic institutional form in international relations.”36 
It is not hard to see that most states prefer to be integrated into some form of 
multilateral or inter-state community. The relevance to this thesis is that 
multilateralism will generate a stronger sense of just action as the decision to partake 
in a specific event or support fellow states, will be removed from a unilateral state 
system and therefore be less likely to reflect negatively on the participating state. 
Theory 
The theory I will use will present the framework for my basic assumptions and 
therefore automatically limit and angle my investigation to some extent. In any 
investigation into a complex topic, it is important to base the underlying assumptions 
on preconceived notions. It is a comfort to the writer that there are different schools 
of thought on an issue, on which he or she can use as a platform to develop and 
present ideas. This is exceptionally present when analyzing international relations, 
with some assumptions and theoretical paths dating back to ancient Greeks and, in 
some instances, even further. One can conduct an investigation of the use of force 
within any school of thought, indeed most, if not all, theories of international 
relations will give meticulous attention to force as it is one of the central tenets of 
power and behavior in world politics. The issue of legitimacy however, is more 
specific and is treated with more reverence within the liberal schools of thought. In 
the more traditional theories, such as the realist school and its adhering theories, 
focus more on the power of states and their right to maximize self profit within an 
anarchic system. I believe my approach is closer to the liberal structure of theory 
because I assume as my basic premise that security structures which limit state 
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sovereignty are necessary for maximizing legitimacy and that such a concept holds a 
powerful place in international relations. I will use the theory of Regional Security 
Complexes as my starting point, the principles of which is presented below, and try to 
complement it by adding a dimension of legitimacy.  
A regional view of security! 
I have opted to take on the regional view of security as presented by Barry Buzan and 
Ole Wæver in their work; ‘Regions and Powers’ from 2003.37 Due to the regional 
aspect of security, it is important to view legitimacy through regional politics and 
relations. This will be especially important for smaller states and perhaps most visible 
within the European regional structure. The region is defined as a situation of 
interactivity where the units are sufficiently linked together so “that their securities 
cannot be considered separate from each other.” 38 
 
Regional Security Complex Theory 
The basic premise is as follows; After the end of the Cold War, the change in security 
structure and perception has caused a strengthening of regional security ties. Buzan 
and Wæver writes that “after the ending of the Cold War, both the remaining 
superpower and the other great powers  (China, EU, Japan, Russia) had less incentive, 
and displayed less will to intervene in security affairs outside their own regions.”39 
Therefore the concept of the Regional Security Complexes Theory was established. 
Regional security structures have been present through much of history, mainly 
because the surrounding territories of a state poses the most obvious and present 
dangers to its security, or as Buzan and Wæver argues, threats travels easier over 
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shorter distances.40 This theory is an attempt to make a realistic model of the post-
cold war security structures of the world, however it  does not declare that the 
regional level is the only relevant level of analysis, nor does it argue that the 
multitude of different regional complexes are similar in behavior or characteristics. I 
interpret the regionalist approach to be a flexible theory if international security 
because it allows for the participation of non-state actors and attempt to explain the 
rational thinking of states on security issues. The national and global levels of analysis 
are the most common levels of security analysis, however they are both too narrow 
in their scope of analysis because security is a relational phenomenon and the 
immediate surroundings of states are their primary concern41. Therefore is the 
regional level, the appropriate level for analysis in the modern world.  
 
Security Complexes 
The main component of this theory is that the world of security relations has become 
increasingly regionalized since the end of the Cold war and the end of the 
bipolarization of security. These regions have been coined Regional Security 
Complexes (RSCs) by Buzan and Wæver.42 There are different types of security 
complexes, depending on the power balance, security cooperation level and the 
presence of powers. The main variants are the standard and the centered RSCs.  
The standard RSC is determined by the polarity of regional powers. They are 
dominated by a military-political security agenda and the agenda is set by the 
regional powers within it.43 Southern Africa is a good example as it illustrates the role 
of South Africa in the region as the dominant security actor. The centered RSCs are 
determined by uni-polarity, i.e. a dominate actor. There are subcategories of centers 
RSCs depending on what type of actor is causing the uni-polarity. This can be caused 
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by a superpower, great power, regional power or an institutional power. The 
European example, which I focus on in this thesis is the latter.44 The EU/NATO 
institutional structures are the actors that dominate the security strategy of western-
Europe. Europe also contain several state powers, historically as well as in modern 
times. States such as Germany, being one of the world economic powers through its 
industry and production, and France and the United Kingdom hold permanent seats 
on the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, the region is integrated into larger 
institutional actors that cause its polarity.  
 
regional vs global 
I do not assume that the global aspects of security has been replaced by the regional 
approach. In fact, I would say the regional complexes of security have become a new 
level of actor on the global scene. The superpower(s) of the system, whether a 
unitary actor or several, will be the only actor who focuses its security concerns on 
the global level.45 If one looks at the system today, and the American attention to 
security issues outside its region, this will be in accordance with the assumption 
above. The regional aspect of international security is merely the relevant level of 
analysis today and it offers a unique opportunity to assess the security thinking of 
modern state. A state will adjust its security agenda according to the region it belongs 
to. For example, a state which is under a protectorate of a powerful ally or a member 
of a collective security organization will have a different view on its own need for 
direct security than a state which is largely independent and not incorporated into a 
larger security complex.  
 
Superpowers, Great Powers and Regional Powers 
The bipolarity of the Cold War affected all aspects of political action for five decades. 
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The war of ideologies and demonizing of the other side had become an entrenched 
notion in International Relations; however the last decade of the twentieth century 
witnessed the start of a new era and way of thinking about international politics and 
security. Buzan and Wæver argue that the Cold War structure of IR was a 2+3 system 
of super powers and great powers.46 This means that there were two dominating 
superpowers which dominated the agenda of politics and security, while three great 
powers were major players in the system and influenced their security region. The 
super powers were obviously the USSR and the USA, while the Great Powers of the 
time were China, Germany and Japan.47  
Today, the world is a 1+4 system with the USA acting as the only Superpower by 
definition. The pertaining Great Powers today are argued to be 
“Britain/France/Germany-EU, Japan, China and Russia.48 Therefore one can see that 
the actors are the same, however the end of the Cold War shifted the roles of the 
different actors to create a new hierarchy.  
Most important to this thesis however, is the concept of regional powers within the 
system. The regional power will be the strongest actor within a regional security 
complex. There can be more than one regional power, which is illustrated by the 
European example of a security complex. The interesting feature of regional powers 
is that they act as the polarity of their region and sets the security agenda within their 
complex. Buzan and Wæver again argues that threats travel easier and faster over 
shorter distances and, on the basis of this assumption, a state’s security concerns are 
focused on the immediate vicinity of its own territory.49  
I would argue that a state’s security concern has become the collective concern, 
therefore organizations with a primary focus on collective security has taken on a 
more important role in modern international relations. The theory adopted in this 
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thesis is chosen to keep an open approach to non-state actors in security question, in 
fact the authors of ‘Regions and Powers’ argues that the theory of a regional 
approach on security is open to the role played by non-state actors and even allow 
them to be dominant in the regional structure.50 This can be seen by the role of NATO 
in Europe and North America. 
 
Force and multilateralism 
The use of force within the regional security structure is dependent upon the 
perception of threats and the level of collective security cooperation. It is important 
to note that every regional security complex has a distinct way of viewing security 
and what their appropriate responses to this issue should be.  Some regions might be 
considered to be dominated by a regional power, North America, the Caucasus and 
southern Africa can be viewed in this light.51 Nonetheless, force and violence is an 
inherent part of the international relations structure.  
The use of force today is primarily conducted by security organizations such as NATO 
or the African Union and some unilateral action by the other Great Powers. However, 
when force is decided to be used, it is most often implemented through 
multilateralism as seen in Kosovo in March 1999.52  
Collective action will positively affect the perceived legitimacy of any use of force 
because it downplays the criticism of directly pursuing national interests at the cost 
of another state or group. Multilateralism is considered to be the logical use of force 
in the modern world because it coordinates the security needs of several states, 
often through a unifying organization, and portrays an impression of cohesiveness 
and burden-sharing. I believe that the regional approach to security explains the use 
of multilateralism because it heightens the individual state’s incorporation into a 
larger community with an agreeable set of security objectives and cultural principles. 
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The fringe benefits are also significant, making incorporation into a regional security 
structure beneficial on several levels.  
The European example.  
No regional security complex is more complicated than the European example. This 
can be explained by the role of the region through history as the technologically and 
economically more developed part of the world, i.e. it had the head start needed to 
be militarily dominant. Today the world is a 1+4 system53 and two of the existing 
great powers are in Europe. If one adds the NATO dimension and the security 
guarantees of the Unites States then it is easy to see why Europe holds a central place 
in global and regional security studies.  
After the Cold War, the security situation in Europe changed as a result of the 
‘triumphalism’ of the liberal democracies and their peaceful coexistence.54 The 
ideological basis for the Cold War had retreated and a new order was setting in 
security politics. The regional structure had to change as well, which is perhaps most 
apparent in the institutional changes of NATO in the 1990 to address the its new 
challenges. According to Buzan and Wæver, the European structure of security is 
divided into two security complexes, one which is EU centric and involves the 
western NATO states and the second structure is the Eastern European security 
structure with strong Russian influence. Notably, the Balkan states have a different 
security agenda from the other NATO states and therefore is connected to the 
eastern security complex. Europe therefore has two centered Regional Security 
Complexes,55 however their geographical closeness makes it hard to distinguish the 
boundaries. 
The European example allows this thesis to illustrate the advantage of a regional 
approach to security. A security complex which has a high attention to legitimacy and 
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is active in using force in current conflict provides the empirical evidence needed to 
support the relevant arguments. I will return to the European security example and a 
take a closer look at the Norwegian role in the next chapter.  
 
Legitimacy 
The aim of this investigation is to provide an aspect of legitimacy to the theory of 
regional security complexes. Legitimacy has developed into a moral benchmark for 
the use of force and must be given ample attention when analyzing modern uses of 
force, an aspect I feel is unfulfilled in the regional security complex theory.  
I am not arguing that the theory itself is insufficient, obviously legitimacy was not the 
intended analysis of the authors, however I believe a component which describes 
legitimacy will complement the theory and be viewed as a natural extension of its 
principles.  
The theory itself provides an ample framework for defining an applying the basic 
assumptions of this thesis regarding legitimacy. I will present my arguments in the 
next chapter.  
 
IDEALISM 
I have chosen to add the dimension of idealism to my theories and assumptions, 
because it is hard to separate the issue of legitimacy from its moral and ethical 
components. I do not argue that force needs to be based on altruism56 to be 
legitimate, but it helps to have some connection to culturally approved notions of 
morality and norms.  
Idealism is a sub-section of the liberal school of thought and it differs greatly from 
that of the traditional schools of thought on the use of force. The origin of idealism 
can be found in political philosophy and the works of earlier philosophers such as 
Immanuel Kant all the way up to modern political figures such as Gandhi and Nehru.57 
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Idealism argues that moral principles can be found and should be present in 
international politics and especially within international security issues. The classic 
description of Idealism is “the pursuit and visualization of political plans and goals 
that does not directly relate to the current realities of the world, but to ‘ideals’”.58 
This is a good definition and it shows the ethical component of the theory. This leads 
to the debate on whether the use of force can be illegal according to international 
law and still legitimate. There is no clear presence of morsal principles behind the 
laws which attempt to regulate the use of force. For example, there is much 
controversy and disagreement on humanitarian interventions. It has become a gray-
zone of international relations, placed between the moral imperative to aid those in 
need and the principle of absolute sovereignty. The advocates of Right to Protect 
(R2P)59 and modern humanitarianism argue that the prevention of genocide and 
other humanitarian disasters are more important than the upholding of the 
Westphalian principle of state territory. There is no denying that the moral aspect of 
force appeals to the public of a given state more than other actors, especially if the 
state implements the moral principles which are dominant in the country and region 
it operates in. Much of the legitimacy debate is concerned with the perception of 
‘doing good’ or ‘right’ when it comes to the decision to use a state’s military forces.  
An important part of the idealism debate is the concept of Just War as presented by 
Michael Walzer.60 I have chosen to add this part to the theory which makes the 
framework for the thesis, because Just War theory in its scope, deals with the 
premise of my arguments, but within the view of idealism. Therefore it makes it 
practical to use as a starting point for introducing the concepts of legitimacy to the 
regional view of security, which will take place below. Waltzer argues in his work that 
“a legitimate government is one that can fight its own internal wars”61. However, 
when a state is not able to and the consequences are humanitarian distatsers, such 
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as genocide, then idealism calls for the intervention from other states or 
organizations. Waltzer however argues that “states don’t send their soldiers into 
other states, it seems, only in order to save lives.”62 This highlights the unique 
problem of arguing for legitimacy of force based on idealist claims, because a state 
rarely (or never) decides to use force for mere humanitarian reasons.  
Idealism calls for, and argues for the possibility of, security policy based on ethical 
and moral principles, Charles Guthrie puts this as having “sufficient and 
proportionate cause.”63  Idealism argues that using force because it is the right thing 
to do is enough to warrant legitimacy. I will take a closer look at these claims when 
assessing what factors affect the perception of legitimacy below.  
 
In summary; the international security scene has witnessed a regionalization of its 
structure due to the security logic of states on the post-Cold War era. The security 
tradition of each region affects how it views the use of force and the need for 
legitimacy towards its application. I hope to show how legitimacy can be achieved in 
the regionalist structure and that legitimacy is a function of more than mere idealism. 
Idealism plays a large part in the legitimacy efforts of states due to the need for an 
impression of ‘oughtness’ and ‘rightfulness’ in the different audiences and actors that 
affect state behavior.64 However, there are several other factors that affect the 
perception of legitimacy.  
I will now attempt to explain the rise and role of legitimacy within the theoretical 
context that was laid out above.   
The Issue 
Above I have presented the theoretical framework for the structure of international 
security and the root of legitimacy. The Regional Security Complex Theory shows that 
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security has become increasingly regionalized since the end of the Cold War65 and 
Idealism argues that legitimacy is acquired through using force altruistically and with 
humanitarian intent. Therefore I see it as my task to challenge these assumptions in 
the next section and pursue the hypothesis stated in the introductory section. I hope 
to be able to show below that the Regional security Complex theory can be used a 
good framework to promote legitimacy as a function of international security. 
Moreover, I aim to illustrate that legitimacy is derived from a more complex 
background than mere altruism as the theories of Idealism argues.  
My method of approach will be to analyze what factors affect legitimacy today and 
investigate the potential consequences of illegitimacy towards different audiences. In 
addition, I will argue that multilateralism is the best option for states to pursue 
legitimacy when using force and how this coincides with the regionalization of 
security. 
My analysis in presented below.  
 
The rise and importance of legitimacy! 
Every decision to use force comes with a multitude of discussions and opinions 
regarding the decision making process and its method for implementation.66 This 
stems from the assumption that the authority that orders the use of force is doing so 
on behalf of the wider interest of the population from which it draws its authority. 
The population of any state will have some influence on the political decision making 
process because a government is accountable for its actions to the public, i.e. the 
voters. I do recognize however, that this assumption is contingent on the level of 
public freedom and how liberal and transparent the political leadership is. 
Nevertheless, politics is inherently connected to the ‘demos’67 of any state, i.e. the 
people, from which power is based. 
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 I have argued extensively in the previous sections that legitimacy is increasingly 
important in the modern world. I will try to account for this increase in importance 
below. I do not argue that legitimacy is a purely modern phenomenon; in fact I have 
argued above that legitimacy has been a part of politics and the use of force 
throughout human history. It is important to stress however that legitimacy as a 
doctrine and concept enjoys its most significant role in contemporary security policy. 
The influence of legitimacy and its application to the use of force is unprecedented in 
history and should therefore warrant a closer analysis.  
 
My analysis will entail some arguments that will demand examples from current 
security affairs. I will use the European security complex as an example to illustrate 
my arguments as well as taking a closer look at the Norwegian model of security for 
the state specific aspects of legitimizing force.   
 
The analysis of legitimacy and its increase will begin with identifying the factors which 
has enabled its strong position in the world of security. I argue that legitimacy has 
become more important in the world because of three separate factors; the role of 
civil society, the dogmatic change after the Cold War and the search for global ideals 
and norms as pursued by the United Nations and pertaining organizations. An 
analysis of each factor is presented below.  
 
The role of Civil Society 
The most prolific critic of state policy, especially in the European security complex, is 
the people and the structures of society which voices the opinion of the public. I 
believe that the key to understanding legitimacy in the modern sense lies in the 
analysis of the actors that demand it and the potential ramifications they can cause. 
Civil society is perhaps the most influential actor in determining political legitimacy in 
the modern world and an analysis is necessary to understand its contribution to the 
role of legitimacy today.  
36 
 
According to the London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society, its definition is 
“Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared 
interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from 
those of the state, family and market”68 In short, civil society holds the elements of 
society which are independent from the state and express the opinions of its people. 
Examples of such structures can be seen in interest groups, non-profit organisations, 
activist groupings and the free press. I do not argue that all such actors are totally 
state-independent, however in essence they act to ensure the interest and rights of 
the public. A strong civil society acts as the forum for debate on state policies and 
public will. The development of civic structures is a prerequisite for stable liberal 
democracies69 as it encourages the people to participate in the political and public 
spheres.  
 
The demand for legitimate policies by its people remains one of the most influential 
and vital aspects of instilling legitimacy as the prerequisite for using force. Thomas 
Jefferson wrote; “When the people fear their government, there is tyranny; when the 
government fears the people, there is liberty.”70 I hold this quote to be accurate of 
my arguments for the role of civil society. 
 Basically the discussion boils down to the degree of accountability. If one increases 
the amount of public participation in politics and civil society, one should expect to 
see a rise in the desire to legitimate state policies, especially the use of force. The 
political element of many civil society organizations facilitates better awareness and a 
more informed citizenry, who make better voting choices, participate in politics, and 
hold government more accountable as a result.71  
The use of force is an especially volatile issue to the civil society. Issues relating to 
military action will always be under more scrutiny by actors in society than most 
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other issues. I attribute this phenomenon to the heightened scepticism among the 
globalising civil societies towards hidden agendas for state reasoning and the 
potential consequences to civilian populations in the conflict area as argued by 
General Rupert Smith.72  
 
In the European example, this can be shown to be accurate. According to 
Transparency International73 Europe has a low level of state corruption and a high 
degree of public participation in the political sphere.74 This supports my argument of 
the role of civil society and the demand for political accountability. With a healthy 
political system and high level of public transparency and participation, the demand 
for accountability and ultimately legitimate use of force is heightened and intensified.  
 
The last point I will make regarding civil society is that the access to information 
which is independent from the state is vital for the functioning of civil society and 
public participation. The last two decades have seen an explosion in information 
technology which has directly affected the way people are connected and have 
access to information and forums to discuss issues. The internet is especially 
important as it gives the population an infinite access to information and 
opportunities. Another important aspect is the notion of free press and liberal rights 
of expression. As Almond and Verba argued above, civil society facilitates better 
awareness of the public75 and being able to debate and access information is 
important for the effective function of civil society, and ultimately the demanded 
accountability in politic and legitimate use of force.  
 
End of Bipolarity 
The second factor to cause the increased importance of legitimacy in the modern 
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world is the end of the Cold War and the paradigm shift in policy thinking it brought 
with it. I have mentioned the significance of the Cold War and its abrupt end in 1991 
extensively in this thesis, however it is not without cause. The following years 
witnessed the world trying to identify the new set of rules and norms following the 
end of an era, especially in international security. The Cold War dominated the scene 
for almost five decades and the role of the institutions and actors would have to 
change its functions and intentions in the new setting. The emergence of the 1+4 
system, with the USA being the only superpower, set the stage for a shift in global 
politics, at least a shift towards the ideology of the surviving superpower.76 With the 
downfall of the Soviet Union, the western principles and the ideology of liberalism 
and market economy was preached more fervently. This phenomenon affected the 
states in the former Soviet sphere of influence. The doctrine of the post Cold War era 
encouraged humanitarian principles in politics and when using force. Legitimacy 
became a larger issue on the security agenda of states and institutions as a 
consequence. The NATO mission to Kosovo in 1999 was an example of this.  
During the Cold War, the security logic of states was dominated by fear and 
suspicion. At its end, the optimism that followed inspired new ideals to focus security 
thinking on. The veil of fear was lifted from the security field. Therefore, I argue, on 
the background of the abovementioned assumptions, that the Cold War ending was 
itself a great contributor to the rise of legitimacy and it importance in international 
security. To illustrate one must only look to the shift in policies of states and 
organizations. For example, the transformation of NATO was needed to respond to 
the new security need of its members.77 According to NATOs mission statement ; 
“major internal reforms were needed to adapt military structures and capabilities to 
equip them for new tasks, such as crisis management, peacekeeping and 
peacesupport operations.”78 In short one might argue that the role of NATO and 
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state’s security logic, especially in Europe, had shifted to ensuring peaceful 
development and security cooperation. Most states cut their defence spending 
significantly, some even by 25% due to the decreased level of perceived threat to 
their security.79 
This is a monumental shift in security strategy. It is not difficult to see the link 
between a decrease in perceived threats and the rise of alternative security 
strategies. By this I argue that the disappearance if a direct threat to the security of a 
state can lead to the emergence of a new security logic based on norms, ethics and 
morality.  
 
Globalisation of ideals  
The third aspect of modern security that have promoted legitimacy is the overarching 
institutional structures that are meant to regulate state interaction. The promotion of 
legitimacy is prevalent in the structures that are meant to regulate state behavior. By 
installing the Geneva and Hague Conventions80 and the United Nations Charter, the 
institutions of state cooperation have announced that a universal set of rules for the 
use of force is necessary for international peace and stability. Unfortunately this ideal 
has not been implemented effectively as the history of violence in the twentieth 
century will bear witness to.  Nevertheless, a set of accepted behavioral norms are in 
place today. Among this set of rules is the scope to which legitimacy can be achieved 
and argued. Ian Clark argues “legitimacy can be conceived as a political space, but not 
an unbounded or normatively autonomous one.”81 The political space he refers to is 
the cross-section between appropriate international forums and the genuine desire 
to legitimate one’s policies.  
In addition to the missions of the international community to maximize the premise 
for legitimacy, one acknowledge that the homogenization of political values takes 
place within regional security complexes over time and that will contribute to the 
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universalisation of ideals and regulations on the use of force.  
This trend is historically traceable. The intention of the Concert of Europe and the 
League of Nations can be seen as earlier attempts to manifest an international order 
on the basis of common values and principles.82 
 
To summarize, legitimacy has become increasingly important to the security policies 
of the twenty-first century. Moreover, it has become a central concern for states 
security logic as well as organizations committed to collective security. The rise of 
legitimacy as an influential factor can be seen in light of the three factors mentioned 
above; the strengthening of civil society and public participation in politics, a change 
in security thinking following the end of the Cold War and the historically relevant 
implementation of ideals and norms in international relations as advocated by the 
United Nations. I will return this discussion further below as I will attempt to analyse 
the future relevance of legitimacy on the use of force.  
 
The next section will focus on identifying the audiences of legitimacy claims. To 
understand the role f legitimacy one must analyse the role of audiences that 
influence a state or organisation to pursue a legitimate course of action.  
 
The consequences of illegitimacy 
In this section I will try to analyse the consequences of lacking legitimacy when using 
force. As discussed previously, legitimacy comes from the perception of correct 
decision by appropriate authority. In modern democracies, this relates to the 
accountability of the government to ensure the general interest of the people and 
the global community. Therefore a lack of legitimacy should cause some 
consequences or negative effects on the government or acting party.  
I have identified the main actors to which a state justifies its policies and use of force; 
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the people it represents, the domestic and international press, regional partners, 
organizations to which the state hold obligations or interests and the region in which 
the use of force is implemented. The following section will try to account for the 
attempts of states to legitimize its security policies towards these audiences and 
analyse the potential consequences of perceived illegitimacy. I will argue that the 
demand for legitimacy varies between the audiences, insofar as the reasoning for 
legitimacy is based on different sources of argumentation. It is also important to note 
that the audiences and their influence will differ from state to state 
In short, trying to achieve legitimacy is founded on “providing persuasive reasons as 
to why a course of action, a rule, or a political order is right and appropriate.”83 To 
elaborate, Martin Shapiro notes that legitimacy is dependent upon ‘giving reasons’ to 
the correct audiences.84 In essence, this is exactly what I am trying to bring forward 
with this section.  
 
The people 
The population of a state is perhaps the most influential factor in determining the 
level of perceived legitimacy of state actions. In theory, all actions of states should be 
rooted in the approval of its people.85 The population is the source of power for a 
government which makes it also the most prolific critic of its actions. The level of 
impact that the people can extend to its political authority is, naturally, dependent on 
the level of civic freedom and participation in public affairs. In a state where the 
rights and opinions of the people are suppressed, the expected level of criticism 
towards legitimacy is going to be much lower than in a state with extensive public 
freedom of expression and political participation.86 This argument boils down to the 
access of the people to voice their opinions towards the political authority; the civil 
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society plays a large role in determining this impact.  
Lack of public support can be detrimental to popular opinion of the public towards a 
regime or governments. The use of national defense units to use force will always 
come under specific scrutiny from the public. One must make a distinction between 
the initial perception of legitimacy and the development of this impression as the 
force is actually used. In the initial phase of a conflict, the people’s perception of 
legitimacy is focused on the right to use force, i.e. the accordance with national and 
global laws and norms. However, over time, the factors that affect the perception of 
legitimacy are influenced far more by the actual implementation of force and the 
affect it has on the domestic scene. For example, the cost of the use of force is often 
an argument against a governments security policy.87 It is not hard to argue that 
participating in security operations or even pursuing unilateral action comes with a 
great cost o the state. In contemporary America, this is especially relevant.88  
‘The body-bag effect’ is also important to the public perception of legitimacy. If the 
national forces sustain loss of lives as a result of the use of force, the impact on 
domestic society can be detrimental.  
The underlying argument with this element of the legitimacy debate is that the public 
perception of legitimacy is important for a state because it affects the popular 
support of the government. If the public support decreases it will have a direct affect 
on the actions of the political opposition and other critics of the government. This is 
relevant to all types of government because the obedience and support of the civil 
society is important for political stability and opinion. The government’s ability to 
effectively pass bills and create a majority consensus can also be affected by the 
public’s impression of legitimacy. This goes to show how powerful an effective and 
participating civil society and general population can be in the modern world.  
 
The last aspect is the people’s perception of threat and imminent danger. The 
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existence of a states security forces is to ensure the survival of the country and the 
protection of the population. The people is far more likely to perceive the use of 
force by the state as legitimate if there is a real sense of fear among the people. If the 
state has a distinct enemy to confront, then the demonizing of this enemy can affect 
how willing the people is to use force and view it as legitimate.89 For example “the 
American threat perception was extremely high after September 11th, but this deep 
sense of peril was not shared by much of the international community.”90 This goes 
explain the massive popular support for using force immediately after 9/11 in the 
American opinion. There was a unifying sense danger and a massive perception of a 
foreign threat. This went a long way to legitimize the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan 
among the American public. Nevertheless, the same levels of support was not found 
internationally. 
The Media: 
No element of modern society is as important in affecting the public opinion than the 
domestic and global media. The ability to set the agenda of issues is unique and 
should therefore be given some attention in this analysis. As argued above, the 
support of the public is important for a multitude of reasons. The media, through the 
printed press, the internet and radio, among others, play an important role in 
determining the opinion of the public. Initially it gives the public access to 
information about state activities and is therefore vital for the population to shape an 
opinion. Secondly, and perhaps most important, it is able to set the agenda for public 
debate. The concept of hearts and minds is well covered in modern conflict. Winning 
the hearts and minds of the people is vital for support in the conflict area but also on 
the domestic scene.91 The media is a main determinant for hearts and minds. The 
consequences of negative media coverage can be wide spread. Within the European 
security complex, the role of the media is profound due to the principle of free press 
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and opinion inherent in most European states. Through the effective use of media 
and press, the population and civil society are informed of the actions of its 
government and is able to hold it accountable for its shortcomings. I do not argue 
that the press only works as a watchdog for criticizing government. In fact, the 
domestic and international media can be used, and is used actively, by the state or 
organizations to gain favorable opinion from the public or other actors. Nevertheless, 
a free press can cause a dramatic impact on the political credibility of a regime or 
government.  
Traditionally the media’s role in determining legitimacy has been in regards to 
propaganda. The modern age however is characterized by access to mass information 
which changes the role the media play significantly. One should not undermine the 
potential impact the media has on creating an atmosphere of perceived legitimacy in 
the public.92  
The Civil war in Somalia which witnessed a US-led United Nations intervention in 
December 1992 can illustrate the impact of the global media. This was coined the 
CNN-effect and signaled the first major conflict with live television coverage.93 The 
pictures of starving children prompted the intervention as President Bush was 
campaigning for re-election and popular opinion was vital.94 This initially illustrated 
the impact of the cable-television and media impact on American opinion. However, 
the withdrawal of US troops in 94 was also party media influenced. The events of 
October 3rd 1993 would play a significant role on the US opinion. The pictures of killed 
US troops being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu was broadcast over the 
world.95  
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In short, the media can play a massive role in shaping and changing the public 
support of a government and its policies, thereby undermining the state’s attempt to 
legitimize its decision to use force. 
The Regional Partners:  
While the perception of the people and the role of the media is focused on the ethics 
and morality of using force in order to perceive it as legitimate, the role of a states 
regional partners or neighbors will turn its attention to the greater impact and 
consequences.  
I have decided to separate the regional neighbors of a state from the larger 
international community as an audience because the security relations of states will 
be much closer and intricate on the regional level. Linking back to the regional 
security complex theory, a state’s main concern will be with its immediate 
surroundings.96 The security complex of a state will have a security tradition which is 
based on its RSC type and the dynamic of state relations. The presence of a great 
power or a regional power will greatly affect the type of security tradition that 
influences the security logic of its pertaining states. By security tradition I refer to the 
accepted norm for state behavior. This norm is most often determined by the 
security need of the region and discourages unilateral use of force in general terms. 
Buzan and Wæver writes that RSC’s are socially constructed based on interlocking 
security needs.97 Regional neighbors are therefore an audience which demands 
legitimacy for using force.  
Security complexes and states differ from the people or media on the grounds to 
which they demands legitimacy. Assuming that states are rational actors, it is logical 
that a state’s regional neighbors will assess the legitimacy of force on principles of 
international legality and the adherence to regional rules and norms. If a states 
security logic is in adherence with its regional partners, legitimacy is often self-
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attainable because of common needs and integration of security efforts. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is important to legitimize ones security 
efforts to the neighbors whose security concerns are most focused on their own 
immediate vicinity.  
The consequences of lacking regional support can damage a state’s position within 
the regional security complex. Furthermore it can decrease the regional security co-
operation and destabilize the security of the region. 
 
International Community: 
I argued in the first section that an legal mandate will be the most effective 
legitimizing factor for using force in the modern world. The logic of this assumption is 
that the consensus of the international community will positively affect all the 
audiences’ perception of legitimacy. Moreover, it will authorize force based on the 
values of the community at large. The United Nations Security Council is, in effect, 
the only international organ capable of issuing a mandate which is generally 
accepted. This happened on several occasions in the twentieth century, perhaps most 
notably in Korea in 1950 and Bosnia in 1995.98 Mandates are effective in legitimizing 
force because it adds the most proficient legalist aspect of international law.  Kofi 
Annan argues that a UN mandate is important to the decision process behind using 
force, when writing; “Most of us would prefer, I think, - especially now that the Cold 
War is over – to see such decisions taken collectively, by an international institutions 
whose authority is generally respected. And surely the only institution competent to 
assume that role is the Security Council of the United Nations.”99 
The international community expects legitimacy based on the laws and rules which 
are generally agreed upon, such as limiting the use of force to self defense as 
stipulated in the UN Charter.100  
Unfortunately the legal provisions of the international community are not sufficient 
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in creating an abiding atmosphere for states and so-called gray zones of 
interpretation emerge.101 I will return to this argument below. 
Sanctions, international critique and the possibility of armed response from the 
international community are among the possible consequences of non-compliance 
with the rules and regulations on the use of force. It has become commonly accepted 
that the provisions for legitimately using force against Iraq in 2003 has been refuted 
due to the lack of announced Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq or 
subsequent weapons programs.102 The governments of the United Kingdom and the 
United States suffered a crisis of credibility from the political environment as well as 
from the public, as a response. Reaching international legitimacy on the basis of a 
preventative or preemptive force is extremely difficult, due to the “questionable 
efficacy of a preemptive strike.”103 The end result was sinking popular support and 
demonstrations against the misleading reasoning for using force against Iraq.  
The idealism of the United Nations indicate that it desires a world of security where 
the only legitimizing factor is the well functioning system of its organisation, 
however, this remains a hope for the future as the structure of the United Nations 
and its Security Council are hindered by a limiting set of rules and regulations to 
which it can distinctly organize the use of force today.  
nevertheless, it remains an important actor in a states methods of legitimizing its use 
of force. The perception of the people can also be greatly influenced by the support 
of the United Nations provisions for using force.  
 
Affected Region: 
The last audience I will analyze in this thesis is the affected region to where the force 
is being implemented. In this definition I will include regional actors and states as well 
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as the local population and civil society. Winning hearts and minds is a part of the 
new order of international security.  
Traditional inter-state open warfare no longer exist.104 Therefore one must identify a 
new framework for analyzing conflict and the use of force. One characteristic of the 
new trend is that the civilian population is an active part of the conflict and the 
enemy is rarely the regular armed forces of the state. Rupert Smith calls this the ‘War 
Amongst the People’105 and one must also actively seek legitimacy from the regional 
and domestic actors in the affected territory. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001 
and 2003 respectively) have proven this by their attention to winning the hearts and 
minds of the local population as well as harnessing local support in the region. 
Though a supremely difficult task, persuading the local population of a targeted 
territory of the legitimacy of force and presence can contribute to a quicker ending of 
the conflict and improving co-operation in a potential post-conflict development era. 
According to a 2007 report by the British Government, the strengthening of civic 
capacities and leadership of the local population will improve the relationship to 
foreign troops and personnel and limit recruitment to violent extremism.106 
It is also important to target regional actors in the affected area. States and 
organizations will demand a claim to legitimacy when force is implemented in their 
region. Maintaining an operational relationship with these actors can make the 
campaign easier as well as having allies in the post conflict development phase.  
The consequences of failed perception of legitimacy in the affected region can 
manifest itself in several ways. Firstly, consequences can be, as mentioned above, 
increased recruitment to the enemy forces or difficult conditions for post conflict 
development. Secondly, it can cause difficulty in maintaining regional ties to 
neighboring states, which can affect political or economic development or logistical 
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problems as seen by Turkey’s reluctance to let coalition forces travel through their 
territory during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.107 
 
The global community and the regional states affected are more in search of a legal 
legitimacy based on respecting global rules and norms as well as long term 
development issues, while the media and the public opinion will demand legitimacy 
based on morality, ethics and human rights violations.  
I will not entirely limit each audience to the type of legitimacy they demand, because 
each state or regional will seek legitimacy on the basis of cultural norms and 
international rules. It could seem the ultimate legitimacy would be a symbiosis of 
pursuing national interest in accordance with international law and regulation, but 
conducted with the moral and ethical justification which limits critics of opportunism 
or realist agendas.  
 
Factors of Legitimacy 
I will now focus my attention to the analysis of the issues and factors that affect 
legitimacy. When defining legitimacy above, I argued that it is a fluid concept 
dependent upon individual interpretation and group perception.  The impression of 
legitimacy is affected by several factors, the more significant of which will be 
analysed in this section. It is important to note at the very onset of this analysis that 
this is no roadmap or checklist to achieving legitimacy, because different groups and 
culture have different views on what constitutes legitimate use of force. I will merely 
point out what are the main issues that influence when force is used today and how 
they affect people’s perception of its legitimacy.  
 
The need for legitimacy comes from the dichotomy of the changing nature of force 
and conflict and the increased participation of civil society in political and security 
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agendas. It would seem that the issues of force and legitimacy have been irreversibly 
affected by a globalising age of information and interconnectedness. Therefore it is 
important to look at how states are affected by this change. War no longer exists at 
least in the traditional sense which we are accustomed to.108 There has been a 
massive paradigm shift in the last half of the twentieth century until today. Armed 
conflict rarely happens between two states over clear objectives of territory, power 
or grievances. Instead the world is faced with a new type of conflict. One which Mary 
Kaldor coined ‘New Wars’109 and Rupert Smith named ‘War Amongst the People.’110 
Within this paradigm shift, a new set of expectations to state behaviour has emerged. 
Accountability and multilateralism has become the new norms and therefore we 
must analyse the new trends in statecraft. Depending on the circumstances, different 
factors will play different roles in determining the perception of legitimacy. For 
example, the lack of a UN Security Council mandate has undermined the claim by the 
US government that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was justified. Moreover, breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions as well as the high civilian death tolls, has made this specific 
conflict unpopular among the global civil population.  
I will now present the analysis of the factors that affect legitimacy, they are 
categorised according to the timeline of action which follows modern use of force.  
International Law and State Obligations 
International law is an important aspect of legitimacy in the modern world. Basically 
it is the examination of the limitations to state activity and use of force. I argue that 
this is the part of international relations where legitimacy is most volatile because a 
legal mandate gives the greatest premise for perceived legitimacy. It is vital to 
distinguish legitimacy and legality. Even though they are closely inter-linked in the 
modern age, a legal action is not necessarily legitimate.  
An ideal world would see order and security based on firm international law, a set of 
                                              
108
 Smith, Rupert (2005), The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World, London, Penguin Books, pg 1 
109
 Kaldor, Mary, (1999), New and Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, pg 12 
110
 Sir Smith, Rupert (2005), The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World, London, Penguin 
Books,pg 267 
51 
 
rules and regulations which are mutually agreeable. The United Nations strive for this 
scenario, however the realist principles of statehood and national interest is still 
present, making it hard to create a universally acknowledged set of laws to govern 
the use of force and state interaction.  
When an act of force is considered legal, it implies that it is permitted by law. 
International law can be defined as “the body of rules that nations generally 
recognize as binding in their conduct toward one another.”111 However, law requires 
authority to implement and enforce such regulations. I believe this is the greatest 
challenge to the legalist argument for legitimacy today.  
I would argue further that international law, if implemented correctly, would be the 
greatest factor in determining legitimate use of force.  
 
Today we witness a multitude of organisations and treaties which try to regulate 
international behaviour through ‘law’. The most important contributions to creating 
such a set of laws, is the United Nations Charter, which proposes a set of rules and 
norms which will ensure peace and security for all nations. Use of force can only be 
used in self-defence and never as an act of aggression or self-interest.112 Alongside 
the Charter itself, the United Nations has the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which 
can, in theory, deal with any dispute proposed by a member state.  
It is not only the United Nations that has contributed to the establishment of 
international law. Most states in the world are also signatories to several treaties and 
conventions which are set to influence the behaviour and relations between states. 
Most relevant to this thesis are the conventions and agreements that affect security 
issues and state conduct in conflict. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are still among 
the most influential agreements on conduct in conflict on humanitarian grounds. 
Along with The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocol offer the international community the best set of rules for the use of force 
and the conduct in conflict. It is vital for states wishing to legitimise its use of force 
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towards different audiences that its conduct and agenda are in agreements with the 
important legislature. Most states are signatories and have ratified the major 
agreements on the use of force.  
 
In short, the use of force in the modern age is regulated by a large number of 
agreements and conventions which define proper conduct and acceptable reasons 
for the use of force. When a state decided to use force, whether unilaterally or 
multilaterally, it is subjected to the scrutiny of international law and its agreements. 
All the conventions, agreements and treaties, as well as the UN Charter, make up the 
concept of international law.  
Next I will analyse how compliance with this concept affects the perception of 
legitimacy. 
I argued above that the use of force will always be perceived as more legitimate if it 
does not break the agreements of international law. Defining what constitutes 
international law is not an easy task; however I have chosen to generalize the 
multitude of conventions and charters that exist in international relations and within 
inter-governmental organizations into the umbrella of international law.  
The public and the media in any given state will be sensitive to this question, 
depending on the level of freedom in the press and civil participation in political of 
course. In general, however, I will argue that non-compliance with agreements that 
either the state is a signatory to or is almost universally accepted, will negatively 
affect the perception of the use of force as legitimate. We must keep in mind that 
legitimacy is a fluid concept and means different things in different societies, but in 
general a state is vulnerable to the public’s criticism towards agendas in its foreign 
policy, especially when the use of military force is concerned.  
One can confidently make the argument that aggression and expansionist doctrines 
will fall outside the realm of legitimacy, at least to the majority of actors involved in 
assessing such a claim. The global community and the civil societies around the world 
are connected and informed to such a degree that legitimacy has gone from being 
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desirable in the past to necessary and vital at present.  
When a security operation or military campaign is rooted in international legal 
principles, which most states acknowledge, it stands a greater chance of gaining 
popular support. 
 
When force is used outside the approval of the Security Council and not on a basis of 
self-defense, it can have adverse effects on the legitimacy of not just the security 
operation, but on the government itself.  Moreover it can negatively affect the 
impression and reputation of the state internationally, which can be illustrated by the 
US approval ratings for its foreign policies among the global opinion. However, lets 
analyse the domestic impact first. Governments, prime ministers and presidents have 
been ousted from office by its parliaments or people over wrong and illegitimate 
decisions to use force. An unpopular war can have detrimental effects on the 
credibility of a government or leader. For example the approval ratings of President 
George W Bush has gone from its peak in September 2001, after the terrorist attacks, 
of approximately 90 percent popular support, to its lowest to date in August 2008 of 
approximately 28 percent.113 It is not hard to see the correlation between approval 
ratings of the public and the participation and initiation of a highly unpopular war. 
The lack of a Security Council mandate and no clear anchoring in other conventions 
has made the 2001 and 2003 military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, 
highly unpopular with detrimental affects to the accountability and legitimacy of the 
Bush administration.  
It seems the infrastructure of the international community has the organs of 
international law installed, which would indicate that non-legal use of force would be 
easy to determine and regulate. Below I will analyse how efficient this system really 
is. 
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The Efficiency 
International Law has the potential to be the ultimate deciding factor in determining 
whether or not any use of force is legitimate or not. If the system of laws and 
regulations were better established and more rigidly enforced then states would be 
dissuaded from using force. This links in with the risk assessment issues I introduced 
in section one. A state must analyse the potential negative effects of any decision to 
use force could have in reverse impacts. If the state views the probability of 
retaliation or punishment as a highly likely, then the expected utility and gain of the 
use of force would have to be accordingly higher to make the decision to use force 
worth it.  
In this analysis of risk assessment and potential gain lays the main issue with 
international law in this debate. The rules and limitations are present, the 
organizations and conventions have been written and signed, however no strict 
authority is present to regulate or punish those who violate the rule of international 
law. Granted there is the International Court of Justice, the World Court and the 
Hague Tribunals, but they have proven inefficient in dealing with the use of force. The 
2008 Russian invasion of Georgia violated several statutes in international law; 
however the world community is left paralysed in enforcing any punishment to either 
side in the conflict. Until the system of international laws and enforcement is 
overhauled, one cannot trust legality to be the only indication of legitimacy 
concerning the use of force. This can also be seen in Noam Chomsky’s book ‘Failed 
States’, in which he argues that certain conflicts and use of force can be “Illegal but 
legitimate.”114 
The presupposed idea of international law is that all manifestations of force upon 
another actor are illegal. The concept of legitimate use of force can only be used 
when it is meant for peaceful purposes. The paradox of violence to end violence 
illustrates how complex this issue is. I argue that the prospects of international law 
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are an ideal to fight for; however it is ineffective at best. It relies on states to follow a 
moral path instead of promoting self interest through force. If the international 
community through the United Nations was able to implement a functioning legal 
system based on universal peace and security with the necessary authority to punish 
violators, then a legalist view of world order would be justified. 
 On a philosophical level which is historically relevant, the Machiavellian issue of 
authority argues for a strong leader to legitimize the issue of right and wrong in 
power and use of force. He argues, like Thomas Hobbes, that without central 
authority a state of anarchy prevails. By looking at the shortcomings of the United 
Nations on this issue, one can see that an almost Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ in which 
national interest is the alternative to a legal system with central authority. I do not 
argue that this is the state of the world today, but the shift towards a morally guided 
global community in which there are rules and norms to state behavior which is 
generally acknowledged has not been completed. The world still holds on to the 
traditional Westphalian nation-state system. An erosion of state sovereignty and a 
commitment to an organizational system which ensures legality is necessary before 
we can call international law as the main determinant of legitimacy.  
 
Jus ad Bellum  
Jus as Bellum is a Latin phrase meaning ‘right to war’ or “right of going to war”115. It 
has come to represent a strain of conflict study that focuses on identifying the 
conditions necessary for a state to wage lawful war or military action. The opinions 
on what these conditions should be and how they would apply to states differ and 
the variations of writers in history has been vast, however, the main assumption is 
that war cannot be started on grounds of mere state gain. An expression of Jus ad 
Bellum can be found in the UN charter, which states that a country can only 
participate in war in self-defence or on a peace-promoting mission condoned by the 
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international community and the Security Council. This shows the most prominent 
example of Jus ad Bellum in the contemporary world. It acts as a framework for 
international rules that governs the advocated norms of the international 
community. It is worth noting that the principles of Jus ad Bellum is not a constant set 
of rules, but rather a concept in which interpretation and change can occur.  
One can identify attempts to address the issue of legitimate warfare at many 
instances in history. St. Augustine, a bishop of the fourth and fifth century116 wrote 
about the attainment of salvation for mankind. He saw war as something detached 
from this objective and sought to identify conditions for legitimate use of force by 
states in order to promote peace. According to Reichberg, Syse and Begby, 
“Augustine was the prism through which earlier just war ideas are refracted and 
transmitted to the Middle-Ages and modern times.”117 Hence one can see the 
significance of Augustine’s work and influence. His most important contribution to 
the Jus ad Bellum debate comes with his presentation of a set of criteria for 
legitimate use of war. St Augustine stresses the importance of ‘right authority’, which 
he links with divine instalment. With legitimate authority comes the right to use force 
however only under the right circumstances. These circumstances must be ‘Just 
Cause’, i.e. in response to an attack or injury118 and not for state gain or the will to 
dominate, and ‘Right Intention” which would entail following strict codes of conduct 
in war and not turn to brutal savagery, but rather ensuring to correct a wrong. As I 
will illustrate further on in this essay, the principles of Jus ad Bellum do not differ 
greatly in modern just war theory from that proposed in the early fifth century.  
The introduction to historical accounts of Jus ad Bellum theory was added to this 
essay to portray a line of development and influence on modern accounts of the 
same issues. An influential writer on these issues today is Michael Walzer and his 
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work, ‘Just and Unjust Wars’119 Walzer argues that ethics can be found and 
successfully used in war and the origins of war as a preventative measure. The origin 
behind Waltzer’s initiative lies in the identifying of the horrors of war or as he writes 
”war is hell”.120 Waltzer here brings up the issue of morality in politics, which he 
argues does not relate to the realities of power politics and warfare. He does 
however write further in his work ‘Jus and Unjust Wars’ that established ethics and 
morality in war is the key to limiting war among states. To illustrate this he writes; 
“The restraint of war is the beginning of peace.”121  
The debate of Jus ad Bellum or just war was introduced to civil society, i.e. the public 
and voting masses, effectively by the debate of whether war to protect or help those 
in need is a just war. One of the most interesting and controversial debates 
pertaining to the Jus ad Bellum is the issue of humanitarian Intervention. Warfare 
based on humanitarian principles has received backing by liberal and just war 
scholars and enjoys the general acceptance of civil society based on ethical issues. In 
such respects humanitarian intervention represents the most relevant use of Jus ad 
Bellum principles to justify warfare in modern politics.  
According to international law, as supported by the UN Charter, humanitarian 
intervention is by its definition an illegal act, unless condoned by the UN Security 
Council. Restrictionist actors in international law stresses this point122, however the 
public consensus created by sympathy for the offended victims of war opens for a 
debate in the topic of legitimate intervention on humanitarian grounds.  
Hidden Agenda 
It is important for a state or security organisation to have a clear agenda when using 
force. The public and other actors must believe in the stated objectives for the use of 
force, preferable for morally justifiable reasons. I have discussed extensively above 
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the correct situations which legitimise the use of force. When such a situation occurs, 
for example an act of aggression from another stand and one needs to protect the 
state’s territorial integrity as justified by Article 51 of the UN Charter, it is vital that 
this mandate is not abused to incorporate other state intentions. Moreover, if the 
defending state then uses the cover of defence to pursue other agendas, such as 
revenge or annexation of territory, then this would directly undermine the legitimacy 
of the initial use of force. This is an important issue to notice, because it sets 
limitations to the scope of legitimate use of force and calls for clear and transparent 
intentions.  
The world has become, through experience, sceptical to ethical state intentions when 
involving force and conflict.  This does not mean that states cannot use force in a 
moral and legal way, it implies however that it will be more difficult for states to 
pursue hidden agendas because the international community, the global media and 
civil societies are more attentive to the underlying intentions of states.  
The 2003 US-led coalition which invaded Iraq has been subjected to much of this 
scepticism. Concerns have been voiced of the alleged hidden agenda of the US 
government behind this military campaign. It was claimed that the real intentions of 
this campaign was to gain some control over the world largest oil reserves and 
safeguard the western access to fuel and energy for the long-term future.123 The Iraqi 
production of crude oil has now surpassed three million barrels per day124, and 
according to official reports of the occupational forces, the US Army Corps of 
Engineers have invested 1,7 billion dollars in oil production infrastructure in Iraq.125 I 
am in no way indicating that these allegations are correct, this is not the intention of 
this thesis, however it helps to show how easy such speculations can emerge and 
how it affects how the use force is perceived. Though refuted by the US government 
it undermined the perception of legitimacy for this particular campaign. Once again it 
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is important to stress that legitimacy is dependent upon perception and opinion and 
therefore vulnerable to criticism and scepticism of the media and the public, whether 
domestic or international.  
Right to Participate 
Along with the well established fields of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, I propose that 
in addition there should be a focus on ‘Jus ad Participationem’ which is translated to 
‘Right to Participate’. This is relevant to those states that take part in multilateral 
security operations under command of a larger organization and view global or 
regional security and stability as mutually beneficial objective. Therefore by 
participating in security operations with the intention of ending armed conflict and 
creating an atmosphere of development and stability, they are contributing to 
ensuring their own security and prosperity. This should be in the interest and even 
right of the individual state. I base this proposition on the detrimental effects of 
conflict and how it affects the regional territories indirectly through political and 
economic instability. I argue therefore that states who are willing to use 
multilateralism in accordance with international law and legitimacy, can be viewed to 
have a right to do so. It would be a more legitimate way of promoting national 
interest.  
War is the most destructive event humans can encounter and the concept of Jus ad 
Bellum represents the attempts to bring civilised dialogue and rules to this scourge. It 
is important to stress that the intention of Jus ad Bellum theory aims to prevent war, 
except under very limiting circumstances, and not to identify ways to justify its uses.  
 
So far this thesis has identified the issues of international law and state obligations as 
an important obstacle to legitimising use of force. I have also tried to explain the 
issues of Jus ad Bellum and how the impressions of cause and intention have on the 
overall perception of legitimacy. The abovementioned themes are all concerned with 
when it is legitimate to use force. I will now focus my attention to the issues of Jus in 
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Bello and how it is legitimate to use force.  
I believe this is as relevant an issue to the overarching analysis of legitimacy as the 
aforementioned ones. I have chosen to use this sequence of writing to allow the 
reader to get an almost chronological examination of the course of a conflict or 
distinct use of force, from the legalist views to the post conflict development which I 
will analyse below.  
 
JUS IN BELLO 
In the same field as the Jus ad Bellum debate, this topic comes from the Latin phrase 
Bellum, which means ‘war’.126 In simple terms it refers to the legitimate conduct in 
war, which incorporates the methods, weapons, tactics and targets used to defeat an 
enemy. I argue strongly that this issue has great relevance to the issue of legitimacy 
and the use of force because it affects the opinion of the public and media especially. 
The modern age has witnessed a greater participation in international affairs by the 
civil societies and other potential critics of conflict. Force will always be under specific 
scrutiny because it is designed and implemented to destroy and kill. Therefore the 
world has seen an increase in conventions and treaties which limit the options of 
warfare to minimise civilian casualties and damage to important infrastructure. 
Rupert Smith argues, as stated before, that modern conflict is a war amongst the 
people127, an argument I would agree with to some extent. This is because extensive 
involvement and targeting of civilians in modern conflicts. This paradigm shift in 
warfare has prompted the need for an extensive debate on legitimacy.  
 
It is not hard to see that the military industry develops more deadly and efficient 
weapons constantly, in fact that is their purpose. Eisenhower warned of the military 
industrial complex in 1961 as he saw the dangers in a powerful industry mass 
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producing resources and products to implement force.128 Today this industry is at its 
historical peak with production of military equipment totalling over 1,2 trillion dollars 
worldwide. 129 One of Eisenhower’s greatest critiques was that “Every gun that is 
made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft 
from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.”130 
This is just to illustrate the enormous impact the industry of force has on the world.  
I would like to point of some issues of modern conflict which are likely to affect 
legitimacy. The course of conflict and the use of force is likely to be vulnerable to the 
political decisions of its leaders and the human errors that can occur while applying 
force. These are the issues I will raise below.  
Firstly and perhaps most prominently, the use of weapons are a hot issue to debate. I 
call this the most prominent issue because it is subjected to much media attention 
and public criticism. The relevant angle is that modern armies, especially those of the 
USA and European states possess an extreme technological advantage in military 
capability. The aim of such developments is to gain a forceful supremacy in order to 
defeat the enemy as quickly as possible and sustain few casualties. Modern warfare is 
designed to be exceptionally effective in defeating the opponent or securing the 
objective. I would argue that this is, in part, to maximise the perceived legitimacy of 
the force being implemented.  
Nevertheless, it is the weapons and tactics used that are most vulnerable to criticism. 
There is no lack of conventions in place today intended to regulate what weapons 
that can be used. The aim of these conventions is to restrict the use of weapons 
cause unnecessary suffering to its victims and have a high risk of affecting the civilian 
population.  
The use of cluster bombs is one of these weapons. Though an immensely effective 
method of bombing large areas, it does so indiscriminately and there is a chance that 
                                              
128
 Speech of Dwight D. Eisenhower 1961, details can be found online at URL: 
http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/indust.html 
129
 Global Issues URL: http://www.globalissues.org/issue/73/arms-trade-a-major-cause-of-suffering 
130
 Global Issues URL: http://www.globalissues.org/issue/73/arms-trade-a-major-cause-of-suffering 
62 
 
the fragmented bombs that separate before impact, do not detonate, leaving 
exploding devices in the areas. The convention on cluster munitions was initiated by 
Norway in 2007 and is set to be finalised in Oslo in December 2008, to which 120 
nations is already signatories. It reads that its intention is to “Conclude by 2008 a 
legally binding international instrument that prohibits the use and stockpiling of 
cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians and secure adequate 
provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors and clearance of contaminated areas. 
“131 This is a clear attempt at regulating the methods of warfare and shows how the 
global community is making the use of force more restricted and limited in scope. 
This will have a positive effect on legitimacy, when force is used within the stricter 
rules of engagement.  
Another issue, which has been given a lot of attention in recent years, is the 
deployment of landmines. The problem with landmines is the same as with cluster 
munitions. They are likely to cause unnecessary suffering to its victims and have a 
high chance of targeting the civilian population. To illustrate the importance given to 
restricting the methods of force in the modern world, the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (ICBL) was given the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts in the field.132 
Nevertheless, new weapons are constantly being developed and it is vital for any 
state using force that its methods and weapons are able to comply with the stricter 
rules of conflict.  
 
The use of weapons or tactics which are in direct controversy with the accepted 
international norms, such as using cluster bombs or land mines, will affect the 
perception of legitimacy. It has become vital to any use of force, that it is conducted 
within the right framework. The type of weapons used must also fit this framework.  
  
I have tried, thus far, to show how the use of force in the modern age must follow a 
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different set of criteria in order to be viewed as legitimate. Mainly due to the 
increased demand for accountability and morality in foreign policy and security issues 
especially.  
The treatment of prisoners and civilians while exercising force is of some importance 
as well. As discussed above, the Geneva Conventions declare the correct treatment 
and identifying of Prisoners of War (POWs) and their rights when detained.133 It is 
important to the different audiences of legitimacy because force, when applied, must 
be viewed as more righteous and legitimate than the force used by the enemy. It 
seems the impression of efficiency is more significant than the impression of 
brutality. This is because revenge or aiming to do damage is not the right cause or 
intention in modern conflict.  
The US administration has received massive amounts of criticism for its use of 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on Cuba as a detention centre for illegal combatants in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.134 The detainees were refused POW status and therefore not 
eligible for the rights stated in the Geneva Convention. It is not the aim of this essay 
to assess the legal correctness of such a facility, but it is important to note how the 
Guantanamo Bay facility has affected the global impression of US legitimacy. This is a 
good example of how the perception of legitimacy has been affected by the breaking 
of Jus in Bello principles. The world media and the civil societies demand that the use 
of force is conducted on a moral high-road.  
Therefore, the use of interrogation methods which are prohibited or restricted by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights135 and the United Nations Convention against 
Torture136 will also negative affect the legitimacy and popular support of any given 
security operation where force used. Though many will claim such interrogation is 
necessary and even legitimate, it has the opposite effect among the general 
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population. One can therefore draw the conclusion that inhumane treatment of 
prisoners, whether defined as an illegal combatant or a Prisoner of War, has a 
negative effect on the perception of legitimacy, if it is known to the population and 
the media. 
The last issue I will discuss within the boundaries of Jus in Bello, is the direct impact 
on the domestic population. By this I mean how the use of force by a state, whether 
unilaterally or through cooperation, directly influences the domestic societies. First, 
there is ‘the body bag effect’, which occurs when casualties are sustained and 
brought home. This has a direct impact on the support of the government and their 
decision to use force.  For example, the sustained casualties by the US armed forces 
are believed to have contributed to the withdrawal of forces from Vietnam in 1975 
and also in Somalia in 1994.137 The link here is seen in the decreased popular support 
for their involvement in this conflict and thereby negatively affecting the perceived 
legitimacy and right to use force.  
The second factor of domestic life which affects perceived legitimacy is the cost of 
using force on the national economy. As stated above, this affects the legitimacy of 
the decision making capability of the government and not technically force itself, 
however they are intricately linking concepts.  
When the cost of participating in security operations has a noticeable impact on the 
national economy, it will start to affect the national opinion and the support for the 
government’s decision to use force.138 Moreover, if the security campaign takes 
longer to complete than planned and publically stated, this will cost more resources 
and eventually catch the attention of critical voices.  
 
I have tried to argue in this section that the actions of a state, i.e. the weapons used 
and the tactics implemented, will influence the perception of legitimacy. Historically 
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this was not as prevalent an issue, because of the traditional view of warfare and 
authority; all is fair in war. An interesting point to make, one which I argue for 
extensively, is that a state which has initiated the use of force on a legal and 
legitimate cause may lose this characteristic over its methods on the battlefield or 
treatment of prisoners.  
 
JUS POST BELLUM 
Jus Post Bellum can be defined as ‘justice after war’ and functions as the umbrella 
terminology for the rebuilding and development of the people, infrastructure and 
territory where force has been applied. I argue that when force has been used, 
careful analysis of the impacts such actions has had in the given territory and region 
and it should be determined whether or not assistance to development is needed. I 
argue this because of the destructive nature of conflict and the characteristics of 
‘new wars’139 shows that civil society and the people are targeted and victimized 
more than their historical counterparts.  
If it was not believed that force could be applied for the common good, then force 
could not be legitimised.  Therefore assistance for development after the force is 
used has become vital to the overall view of the legitimacy of force itself.   
 
Democratisation has been a large part of post conflict development in the modern 
age. Nevertheless, this situation generates the problem of the democratisation 
process itself. It has proven difficult to successfully transform former totalitarian or 
theological regimes into democratic societies. Such a process is characterized as 
unstable and volatile, especially in the first periods after the transformation.140  
It is important, however, to hold official elections and establish a new leadership 
whose task it is to promote stability and security to enable development.  
 The key issue, in regards to legitimacy, is to portray the illusion of giving the country 
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back to its people, which would strike back at any criticism for the use of force for 
imperialistic or strategic reasons.  
 
There is also an extensive legal proponent to the Jus Post Bellum debate, insofar as to 
hold the opponent responsible for the atrocities they have committed and the 
reparations due to the surviving people. It is vital for a conflict ridden state or region 
to have a proper reconciliation and healing process in order to lay the fundament for 
the future. The organization or state which have conducted the security operations 
are often viewed as responsible for this process as well as organizing and funding the 
rebuilding and development of the country itself. I will argue here that this additional 
cost, even if done in collaboration with the United Nations or other donor states, will 
present the state or group of states with an enormous task which is consuming in 
both time and resources. The democratization process includes the development of a 
stringer civil society and pertaining institutions to encourage greater freedoms for the 
people. It can impact the global view of the overarching intention and cause for the 
use of force if this type of support for development is not present.  
Along with the democratization process, which is concerned with the political 
structures and functioning of the state, it is equally significant to the post-conflict 
development of a state to improve the country’s infrastructure. Hospitals, bridges, 
roads and electricity are all important components of a modern society and 
important for successful development. The national economy and production 
capability is the key to sustainable development, therefore extensive investments are 
often necessary, as well as the implementation of a good education system.  In 
addition, the state must be able to train and use its own security personnel in the 
army and policing units. The domestic security apparatus will automatically have 
more national legitimacy than foreign troops. This is a costly part of the development 
but important for the overall success of the post-conflict timeframe.  
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In short, it is the perception of the moral high-ground which is vital to the impression 
of legitimacy today. The use of force for a good purpose is generally supported but it 
must be done within the framework of the guidelines and rules designed by the 
international community. What happens after the use of force is completed has 
become increasingly significant to this debate and the use of force should be within 
the wider concept of a comprehensive approach. 
 
A Comprehensive Approach! 
The concept of a comprehensive approach should be the norm for conflict 
involvement in the modern age. I choose to define it as having a large scope to its 
attention which involves taking into account all the above mentioned issues to 
maximize its potential legitimacy. I will argue that by having an overarching structural 
plan to the use of force, one can achieve a high degree of perceived legitimacy. It is 
important that the different audiences view the use of force as a component to 
resolving a security dilemma in order to enable national, regional and even 
international development across the board. I support this assumption by arguing 
that only within the context of a publically perceivable goal to do good within correct 
boundaries, can the use of force be fully legitimized.141  
Ideally, an approach which involved the use of force should be a horizontally 
incorporating as possible with a wide range of actors. If states, inter-state 
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) collaborate from start to 
finish, it will have a higher degree of efficiency and legitimacy to rely on. By widening 
the amount of participating actors, the chance of hidden agendas and objectives are 
decreased while a more legitimizing transparency is achieved.  
The comprehensive approach should involve a reasonable exit strategy which takes 
the best interest of the state and people into consideration. One cannot conceal the 
obligations to a comprehensive approach in international crisis management, but 
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that is the price a state or coalition must pay to maximize pits perceived legitimacy.  
 
Multilateralism as a legitimizing factor – the Norwegian and NATO Examples 
Legitimacy comes in all shapes and forms and cannot be argued to be a solid concept 
with fixes variables. Above I have argued that legitimacy is dependent upon the 
perception of different audiences and can be influenced by a multitude of factors. 
The regional aspect of international security allows this investigation to identify a 
concept which will, if applied correctly, comply with the majority of the factors that 
affect the perception of legitimacy as well as deserve the recognition of the 
abovementioned audiences. The concept I am referring to is multilateralism. 
Obviously there are restraints to this assumption. Any random grouping of states and 
actors cannot claim legitimacy purely on the basis of multilateralism. At the core of 
the term lies the concept of collective action. Initially I defined multilateralism 
through Keohane’s analysis as ““the practice of coordinated national policies in 
groups of three or more states.”142 The multilateral organisation has become a 
permanent fixture of world politics, simply because it can coordinate the national 
interests of several actors that are similar or identical in their objectives. Moreover it 
encourages a model of collective responsibility and burden-sharing which are vital in 
displaying legitimising features.  
 
It is important at this point to stress the limitations of this analysis to the security 
domain. Agreeably the field of multilateralism is far more complex and widespread 
than merely security cooperation, however the scope of this thesis warrants a severe 
limitation. I will therefore limit my arguments to the sphere of security politics and 
the use of force, as I aim to show how multilateral engagement can meet the 
abovementioned criteria for legitimacy in the modern world.  
I will not return to a descriptive chapter on multilateralism but rather attempt to 
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apply its assumptions and real-world examples to the regionalisation of security 
theory to assess its ability to acquire legitimacy. The basic notion of multilateralism is 
that its “fundamental argument for legitimacy is that of diversity of representation 
and inclusiveness.143” Simply by avoiding unilateral action it decreases the global 
perception of illegitimate state action.  
 
The Regional Security Complex Theory is a good framework for an analysis on 
multilateralism for three distinct reasons. Firstly, it is open for the polarity of a non-
state actor in a centred security complex. Secondly, the adherence to a security 
complex opens for intricate security coordination. And lastly, it makes a 
homogenisation of security objectives a collective feature of the RSC. When one takes 
these three characteristics of the RSCT, it gives a suitable platform to advocate the 
use of multilateral security operations as a legitimising factor when using force.  
 
Within the European security complex, which this thesis has been mostly concerned, 
there are two main institutional actors, the EU and NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization has proven that it can implement a Security Council mandate in Kosovo 
and warrants a closer look as the multilateral example. This investigation will now 
have two levels of analysis, the multilateral organization and the state that legitimizes 
its use of force through multilateralism, NATO and Norway, respectively.  
 
The Organization of collectivity 
Multilateralism comes in many forms, and is not limited to security and the use of 
force. There are an abundance of organizations that work through a multilateral 
scheme, for example, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is a multilateral 
organisation because it coordinates the efforts of many actors based on mutual 
interests. In essence, multilateralism is merely the combined efforts of several actors, 
however when regarding the use of force, I will limit my scope to the engagement of 
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multilateralism through inter-governmental organizations, such as the United 
Nations. The multilateral organization uses an incorporating political structure to 
pursue its institutional objectives.144 Every inter-governmental organization has a set 
of standards by which it operates and a set of goals it continuingly works towards.145 
The international organization can be considered legitimate on the basis of its 
function and historical record. If its function, through its mission statement or 
charter, can be seen to have a peaceful or constructive purpose then the global 
perception of legitimacy might increase. The perception of legitimacy will similarly be 
affected if its historical record has shown that its efforts and actions in implementing 
force has proven to be in accordance with its mandate or legal boundaries.  
NATO can be viewed in this light as it has been focused on the collective security of 
its members since its conception in 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty reads:  
 
           “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples 
and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common 
heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in 
the North Atlantic area.”146 
 
By analysing the stated objectives of the organisation, one can see that its official 
mission will be in accordance with international norms, so its initial function will seem 
legitimate. However, one must keep in mind its historical purpose during the Cold 
War, to act as a defense organisation against Soviet aggression. Therefore its global 
reputation as a peaceful organisation will be influenced by this role. The modern 
NATO has changed its structure through rigorous reforms however. To illustrate 
                                              
144
 Robert Keohane, The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism, GARNET Working Paper, NO: 09:06, 
September 2006. 
145
 Robert Keohane, The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism, GARNET Working Paper, NO: 09:06, 
September 2006. 
146
 NATO OFFICIAL STATEMENT – Can be found at URL: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm 
71 
 
David Yost argues that the Cold war had allowed NATO to postpone the challenges of 
how to give practical content to its longstanding vision of a peaceful political order in 
Europe.147 NATO will inherently receive criticism for its function and existence from 
actors who see NATO as a threat, most notably, the Russian Federation in regards to 
the desired NATO expansion to include Georgian and Ukrainian membership. I will 
however argue that the function of NATO has been positively received on the global 
scene due to its close relationship with the United Nations and its mission. 
NATO’s legitimacy to use force, as an organisation, will also be judged on its historical 
record. The most important historical implementation of force by a security 
organization on a UN mandate was the 1999 KFOR148 mission in Kosovo to ensure the 
seizure of hostilities by Yugoslav and Serb forces.149 Aimed at intervening to prevent 
genocide, its effect is widely regarded as a success, and its continued existence in 
Kosovo has made the comprehensive approach it has committed itself to, more 
legitimate in the broader spectrum.  
 
In short, the NATO structure provides a good example at how the institutional model 
can offer a multilateral alternative to the use of force and integrate national interests 
in a security complex. I believe that the role of NATO and similar organizations, such 
as the African Union150, provide ample reasoning for an alliance integrated defense 
structure for states seeking to legitimize its security policy. The above mentioned 
factors that influence the global perception of legitimacy are best dealt with through 
a collective responsive with a legal foundation. The role of regional security 
structures based on multilateral action will become more prevalent in the future. As 
Anne Kramer argues; “While the UN security Council will remain the preferred 
authorizer for the near future, regional organizations or other multilateral structures 
could acquire greater ability to legitimize action, or at least greatly encourage the UN 
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to act by being a competitive entity.”151  
 
The Norwegian example 
Because the debate on legitimate use of force has a large domestic sphere, it is 
important to take a closer look at an example of state policy. I have chosen to use the 
Norwegian example to illustrate the role of multilateralism on the perception of 
legitimacy.  
The security policy of Norway since the end of the Second World War has been 
focused on integrating its defense structure into a larger organization to ensure its 
protection. This was especially prevalent during the Cold War as the geographical 
location of Norway in northern Europe made it a strategically exposed part of the 
NATO community. According to the RSCT of Buzan and Wæver, the security logic of a 
state is dependent upon its location and position in a regional complex and its 
relationship to super-, great- and regional powers.152 The security challenges that 
face Norway after the Cold War are the future role of Russia in Europe and the global 
war on terror because it is set as the agenda for NATO and US allies.153 Integration in 
the European security complex through NATO and indirect cooperation in EU, in lack 
of actual membership, is the chosen path for Norway and the perception of its 
legitimacy follow the logic for multilateralism as the legitimizing factor. 
I have assumed in this thesis that the perception of legitimacy comes from a 
combination of maximizing national interest and security with stressing the 
correctness and morality of the actual use of force. In the Norwegian example this 
would mean choosing a security plan most suited to ensuring its security and 
following this plan according to the expectations of the different audiences.  
 
Today Norwegian security personnel participate in operations in several countries, 
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including Somalia and Kosovo. Its armed forces contingent is found in the ISAF force 
in Afghanistan where the Norwegian contingent is in charge of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team in Maymaneh in north-western Afghanistan.154 In total, the 
Norwegian contribution to foreign stability operations are approximately 514 soldiers 
and officers plus over one hundred Special Forces soldiers in Kabul.155  
According to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, the 
Norwegian participation in NATO operations is a part of ensuring the greater security 
for the European region as well as promoting peaceful ideals and stability to other 
regions of the world.156 In essence, the claim for legitimacy is based on the logic of 
multilateral engagements and obligations to a larger security structure. Norway 
chose their allegiance in 1949 when NATO was created, the minister of foreign affairs 
argues.157 Today the Atlantic partnership is a central tenet of Norwegian security 
policy and vital for the state’s foreign political orientation, with the USA as the central 
referencing power.158  
 
The legitimacy of the Norwegian use of force comes from its historical tradition of 
idealism in its foreign policy, which is a part of the population’s consciousness.159 
By combining this historical devotion to the humanitarian field of foreign policy with 
the optimalisation of national interest through multilateralism, the Norwegian 
engagement in stability operations is part self-legitimised. I make this argument on 
basis of the government’s logic of integration into a larger security structure as the 
best alternative to promote Norwegian security and interest.  
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The Norwegian civil society is well established with great individual freedom to 
participate in public debate and politics. It is ranked top in the global index of the 
Liberty of the Press160, which indicates strong public participation in politics and 
debate. Moreover, Norway is placed high in the Human Freedom index161 and enjoys 
a very low level of corruption162. In other words, as a state it has all the conditions to 
enjoy great political accountability as well as being able to demand legitimacy for the 
use of force.  
The Norwegian government uses force only through multilateral engagement to 
assists in crisis management, according to its Government policy and argues that its 
benefits are a security guarantee from NATO and the ability to ensure development 
and stability in conflicted areas.163 
In addition to the stated commitment to a comprehensive approach to its crisis 
management, especially in Afghanistan, the moral contributions to the Norwegian 
security logic is aimed at generating a wide perception of legitimacy when it opts to 
use force.  
The global and domestic media enjoy full freedom of the press in Norway and its civil 
society is very active in involving the population in public debate. The regional 
neighbors of Norway share a similar security logic due to their involvement in a 
common security complex which is centered around an international organization 
which holds high regards towards legitimacy in the global community. One can 
therefore draw the conclusion that the Norwegian example has good expectations of 
legitimating its use of force . 
 
The Norwegian example has shown that legitimacy through multilateral engagement 
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is an effective approach towards the five audiences mentioned above. By only using 
multilateral engagement it ensures a notion of legitimacy based on the rules, laws 
and norms of the international community. Furthermore, it created an atmosphere of 
idealism and morality in its decisions. I would argue that none of the five audiences 
for legitimacy would strenuously disagree with Norway decision to use force through 
NATO, because it offers the state an opportunity to use a morally and legally justified 
approach to ensuring its strategic security as well as promoting its wider national 
interest. Complete consensus of legitimacy does not exist, as I have argued above, 
due to the individual nature of the fluid concept of legitimacy, however, I believe the 
Norwegian use of force today is viewed as legitimate by the majority of its 
population. 
 
The multilateralism shown in the European security complex warrants a high level of 
legitimacy based on the factors stated above. I do not believe a better alternative to 
the use of force exist today, as multilateralism through the United Nations or 
mandated security organizations enjoy the best prospects for perceived legitimacy 
from the five stated audiences by following the factors that affect legitimacy. The 
Norwegian example of NATO engagement has shown that regional security 
organizations are able to provide the necessary qualifications to increase the chances 
of a consensus of legitimacy. I will however argue that this assumption is dependent 
upon the adherence to agreement of the global community and maximizing its 
compliance with international law and norms.  
 
The next section will assess the future of legitimacy and the development of 
international security.  
 
The future of Legitimacy, a lasting impact? 
This thesis has focused on the European Security Complex. A vital characteristic of its 
threat perception is that none of its states are directly challenged over its territorial 
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sovereignty. Therefore its security engagement is focused upon promoting peace and 
stability through security co-operations.164 The hope for the future must lie with a 
strengthening of the jus ad bellum principles and international regulation to create a 
firm framework to which legitimacy can be found or refuted. 
The United Nations aim, at its birth, was to “to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war”165. However in the first decades of its existence, its role in 
international security was overshadowed by the superpower rivalry of the Cold War. 
The end of global bipolarity brought with it a sense of optimism towards global 
leadership. This optimism, however, gave way to scepticism at the end of the 
1990’s.166 The twenty-first century has witnessed a chain of events following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in America which have effectively undermined the United Nations’ 
ability to regulated international peace and security. These events culminated in the 
ongoing invasion of Iraq by US/UK forces.  
I will argue, at this point, that the world does not possess as unifying actor that is able 
to be the sole-legitimising actor in international security. The United Nations is the 
closest we have to such an actor, with its mission statement clearly announcing its 
intentions. 
It seems the international system is unwilling to take the necessary steps to make the 
legitimacy process more rigid and effective. I attribute this phenomenon to the 
hesitation of the remaining superpower and somewhat to the great powers of the 
security systems. The truly global actors of international system are reluctant to 
impose more limitations to its use of force, because force is inherently a tool for 
consolidation of power, position and security. The 2003 invasion of Iraq without a 
Security Council mandate or support by a US-led coalition, as well as the 2008 
demonstration of force by the Russian Federation in the provinces of South-Ossetia 
and Abkhazia in Georgia, will demonstrate my point on this issue. 
Legitimacy has always been a part of using force and in all likelihood; it will remain an 
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important aspect of security policy in the future. However, it has not become 
accepted doctrine to first and foremost abide to the rules and regulations of the 
international system when using force. In order for this to happen, the United 
Nations system must reform with the approval of all its member states.   
 
UN Reform – accountability, regulation and punishment 
At the 2005 World Summit the heads of states and world leaders expressed their 
desire for a strengthened United Nations in order to meet the challenges of the 
twenty-first century.167 Secretary General Kofi Annan called it a “chance to revitalise 
the United Nations itself, a chance for all mankind.”168 Comprehensive UN reforms 
have been planned and desired for a long time. The scepticism that followed the UN’s 
failure to achieve its potential in the late 1990’s have prompted a wide debate on the 
future of the organisation. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has made the UN reforms 
a priority. In regards to legitimacy and the use of force, the necessary reforms must 
come in terms of enhancing the UN role in international security efforts, especially in 
multilateral operations under a UN flag. Moreover, a reform of the Security Council 
itself is necessary because of the perpetuating power positions of the permanent 
members.  
In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance169 released a report on the 
recommended structural reforms for the United Nations.170 The aim of the 
commission report was to suggest a suitable path to increasing the authority of the 
United Nations. The relevant suggested improvements were ending the veto power 
privilege to the permanent members of the Security Council, establishing a standing 
UN army and making the International Criminal Court (ICC) binding to all members 
and affected parties. In essence, it would make the United Nations the only 
legitimate regulator of peace and security in the world, with increased authority. 
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Moreover, it would allow the international community, through multilateral co-
operation to be the regulator of force.171 
 I believe the recommendations of the commission would are created from an 
idealistic standpoint, nevertheless, the outcome would be a strengthened 
international community with the opportunity to effectively regulate the use of force 
in international security.  
  
 
The aim of the United Nations reforms is to centralise the decision making apparatus 
in world affairs. In terms of international security, this would entail a shift in power 
from the state to the global institution. An erosion of state sovereignty is necessary 
for this transformation.172 In the previous section, I argued for the legitimising effect 
of multilateral use of force. The proposed reforms to the UN structure would have a 
profound effect on the way the world, through the multitude of its audiences, will 
view future uses of war. Multilateralism response, through a UN standing force, with 
the backing of an improved Security Council and international law, would surely 
maximise its perceived global legitimacy when implementing force.  
 
“Our task now is to strengthen our capacity for preventive diplomacy, and instil a 
more integrated and effective UN approach in responding to conflict and supporting 
sustainable peace processes,”173  
 
In order for such a comprehensive reform to take place, the awareness of its 
significance is important. It must be the desire of the world for the UN to realise its 
potential, otherwise its reform is futile. Therefore a change in the global agenda and 
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norms is necessary for this transformation to take place. I argued in the last section 
that the key to legitimating force in the modern world lies with multilateral 
engagement, which is only possible through correct mandate, just and proportionate 
implementation of force and wide international recognition of its purpose and 
mission. The power politics of the twentieth century, which is still present today, 
must be limited and integration into a more effective system of global governance 
must take place. A change to the structure of the Security Council will contribute to 
this end because it will limit the great powers of the world to use force as a political 
tool.  
 
One of the most important aspects of the legitimacy debate is the role of the people, 
both domestically and across borders. I named this the role of civil society above 
because of the importance of public debate and participation in politics. The Global 
Governance Commission also called for the establishment of a “parliamentary body 
of civil society” which would be comprised of representatives for the civic interests 
and Non-Governmental Organisations.174 It is the opinion of this thesis that this 
would increase the role of civil societies and therefore increase the level of 
demanded legitimacy for the use of force in the world.  
 
Since the end of the Second World War in 1945 has the world witnessed a change in 
the way we view the use of force. War in the traditional sense, no longer exists, 
argues Sir Rupert Smith, a statement it is hard to refute.175 However, conflict will 
always be on the political agenda, it is arguably part of the human condition.176 It is 
therefore important for an inter-connected world to seek ways to effectively judge 
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force. A framework for this must emerge 
from institutional regulations from laws, norms and obligations to which all states are 
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accountable. I argue in this thesis that multilateralism through a strengthened 
international system is the key to maximising legitimacy. However the system of 
today is unable and unequipped to do this effectively from a central point. 
Multilateralism from the regionalist perspective which is able to intervene within its 
security complex on a UN Security Council mandate is the best option. The NATO 
missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo are good examples of how this can be an 
effective solution. 
Until the United Nations can deal with any security challenge that might emerge, it 
must rely on regional security structures to intervene when necessary.  
 
Concluding remarks 
“War is Just to whom it is necessary” wrote Niccolò Machiavelli on the issue of 
power, force and legitimacy.177 The use of force seems intricately linked with the 
question of legitimacy. The decision to use for by a state, organisation of non-
governmental actor in the modern world comes from a complex process of analysis 
towards the benefits and consequences such an act would entail. The majority of 
military force is implemented by states and they represent perhaps the most complex 
underlying reasoning for opting to use force. Legitimacy is what makes this process so 
complicated.178 I believe this comes from the fact that states are subjected to scrutiny 
from several angles, most notably its people. One must note however that the 
significance of the legitimacy debate is dependent upon the ability of the different 
audiences to voice their criticism or approval towards the acting state, which in turn 
is dependent upon the civic freedoms of the specific state and/or culture.  
 
I have argued in this thesis that legitimacy has become increasingly important to the 
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policy making of the modern era, most notably after the end of the Cold War. I do not 
limit this assumption to the use of force, because legitimacy over-arches the concepts 
of transparency and accountability in politics. Nonetheless, the use of force in the 
modern world is exceptionally subjected to scrutiny and analysis. The events of 9/11 
in America and the military responses which followed in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
further enhanced the international debate concerning legitimacy and force.179 
Therefore I believe that questions of legitimacy will be an integral part of 
international relations in theory and practice in the twenty-first century. I believe my 
analysis above illustrates this assumption. 
 
The use of force must be understood within a regional context as is the premise of 
this investigation. As stated above, a regional approach to international security 
offers the most realistic view of the security thinking of a state and it enables an 
analysis into the efficiency of legitimacy through multilateral cooperation. Taking this 
assumption, I would argue that the incorporation into a state’s regional security 
complex can produce a legitimizing security structure which is based on collective 
action. Moreover, the security logic of a state is primarily focused on its immediate 
vicinity. Most states do not have the ability or ambition to engage in security affairs 
outside its region, so it is important to note that maximizing one’s security potential 
within its security complex can be a legitimizing factor in itself.  
 
 If one adds the dimension of the international law and mandates, it is not difficult to 
argue that regional security structures can be used for crisis management to the 
extent that the global community, through the United Nations, is presently unable to. 
Paul Kennedy argues that “as the United Nations move into the twenty-first century, 
not even its most ardent supporters, could claim that its performance in the areas of 
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peacekeeping and enforcement since 1945 constituted a great success story.”180 
However, the efforts towards making these efforts a global initiative would make the 
legitimacy of force easier to detect and support. This coincides with my arguments 
above that legitimate use of force should come from a mandate in international law 
and be in adherence with globally accepted norms and expectations. The aim of 
which is to limit the use of force to a tool of the international community in order to 
ensure the security of all.  
 
Legitimacy is inherently a fragile concept because it is dependent upon human 
perception and interpretation. The legitimacy of a specific act to implement force can 
be manipulated; this is why the role of civil society and the media is important to 
influence the neutrality of the available information to the people. I argue that 
legitimacy is a fluid and complex issue and therefore hard to determine, however the 
degree of legitimacy should be measured in public and institutional perception in the 
individual states, as well as the global community as a whole. A globalizing world with 
increasing civil participation in politics will continue to demand accountability for 
every decision to use force.181  
The introduction of demanded legitimacy for the use of force indicates a shift 
towards a moral and pragmatic justification when force is applied.  
The world will increasingly witness a global homogenization of norms for the use of 
force, especially if a strengthening of international law and mandates takes place. 
Nonetheless, force can be used without a thorough claim to legitimacy; however the 
state or group of states must see the potential benefits of illegitimate use of force as 
to exceed the potential consequences. The stronger a state’s power position within 
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its regional security complex and in the international system, the more likely it is that 
the state can endure the consequences of unilateral action.182  
The Norwegian example has shown that multilateralism can be used to legitimise a 
state’s security policy, because it builds on the assumption that integration into a 
larger security structure is the best option for a small state. The actions of the state 
within this structure must then be analysed for its legitimacy however, because much 
of the decision-making process is centralized in the security structure, the small state 
is subjected to less criticism for its action due to its obligations to its security 
organization. I would argue that the Norwegian example shows that participation in 
multilateral operations of force through a regional security organization provides a 
state with a good claim for legitimacy and a strong justification in terms of actual 
national interest.   
 
The underlying theory of this thesis presented that the structure of international 
security today is subjected to the processes of regionalization and that the world can 
be divided into several Regional Security Complexes.183 By investigating the 
contingent legitimacy of multilateralism184 I believe the role of RSC’s become 
apparent and that legitimacy through multilateralism, as presented within and by 
security structures, complements the theory of Buzan and Wæver with a dimension 
of legitimacy towards the use of force. Moreover, the theory of Idealism assumes 
that legitimacy is found on the basis of morality and ethics. The complexity of 
legitimacy as concept, however, has shown that it is far too simplistic to state that 
legitimacy is synonymous with morality claims. The nature of international security 
assumes national interest and collective threat perception to influence the 
impression of legitimacy to a large extent. The further study of legitimacy and force 
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must therefore assume that the tenets of idealism will not adequately address the 
origin and role of legitimacy in the modern world.  
The conclusion of the thesis is that legitimacy will play an important role in countries 
with a strong civil society and political transparency; this trend will also become more 
prevalent in increasingly more countries with time.185 It is important for the collective 
global security that all uses of military force is legitimized, however a strengthening 
of the principles and regulation from international law and rules is vital for this to 
become an accepted international doctrine. Therefore, I conclude that legitimacy 
plays a large role in the European regional security structure and Norway is a prime 
example of this. Nevertheless, legitimacy is a fluid concept and is wholly structured 
on the perception of its audiences and can therefore easily be manipulated. I still 
believe, perhaps too ideally, that legitimacy will continue to grow in importance and 
in its ability to influence national, as well as organizational, security policy. The 
regional view on international security offers a good framework for the 
implementation of legitimacy as an actual influence and regulator of the use of force 
in the modern world.  
 
It is the concluding assumption of this thesis that legitimacy plays an important role 
in international and domestic politics; the use of force is perhaps the most 
controversial element of this debate. Force has historically been the privilege of the 
few and mighty and often used as a tool to consolidate or increase power positions in 
the world.186 The remaining super power and great powers are good examples of this 
assumption.187 This notion remains to some extent in the world today and is one of 
the greatest challenges for the implementation of an effective global system for 
legitimating force and ensuring international peace and security. I argued above that 
the reform of the United Nations was a necessary step towards the realization of this 
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ideal, however until then, the regional structures of security complexes may provide 
the global community with the best alternative for future security mandates away 
from unilateral action and with a clear focus on crisis management through a 
comprehensive approach. 
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